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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the mobilization processes 
of the Korean student movement. In order to address the question of how 
the Korean students have been politically so active during the last three 
decades, my focus will be to elucidate the facilitating factors of the 
movement rather than to identify causal variables.
The analysis suggests that it is the organizational structures 
within the superimposed-segmented collectivity that have made it easy for 
the Korean students to engage in mobilizing and sustaining the movement. 
Particularly, cohesive, informal small group organizations on campuses 
have enhanced the chances of facilitating the mobilization processes.
Cultural and historical factors also help to understand the 
movement. A shared sense of beliefs, such as the consciousness of the 
Korean community and the legendary role of students in history, underlie 
the movement groups and make the movement symbolically meaningful to the 
participants.
Ideas are combined with moral and mythical qualities in the culture 
and become a facilitating factor of the movement. Ideas are important for 
the organized protest movement. They provide the direction, a clear 
target, and hopes, without which sustained violent confrontation would not 
be possible. Although ideas in themselves do not cause the violent 
movement, the way in which actors translate them into a plan of action 
becomes important in understanding confrontations. This is what Sorel 
calls a "myth." Therefore, we find the coexistence of both extreme 
characteristics in the ideological rhetoric of the radical Korean 
students: moral virtue and leftist absolutism.
THE KOREAN STUDENT MOVEMENT 
THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates the mobilization processes of 
the Korean student movement during the past thirty years. It 
is designed to describe and explain the Korean student 
activism and its accompanying forms of political violence.
College campuses in South Korea have been turbulent with 
frequent student unrest during these three decades. This 
continuing student movement has become one of the most 
structurally cohesive and tactically operative forces of 
political opposition in the country. The students of South 
Korea, unlike those in most other third world countries, have 
played a major role in political and social change. This has 
been a notable phenomenon in the political development of 
South Korea. For example, Korean students took an active part 
in overthrowing the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960 and 
intimidating the Park Chung Hee government. They were also 
leading actors in forcing the Chun Doo Hwan regime to make 
major changes in June 1987. Although the specific functional 
role they perform in the process of political 
institutionalization in Korea is hard to assess, the students 
are a politically active group particularly in the dynamics 
of political opposition. They continue pressing the present
2
3Roh Tae Woo government toward greater "democratization” and 
toward regaining their "national identity" - i.e., the
reunification of the country. At the same time, they strive 
to organize laborers, farmers, and poor urban groups.
It may puzzle many Westerners that so many competent 
Korean students have continuously risked promising careers by 
committing themselves to the student movement. That Korean 
students have become such a politically powerful group in 
their country may also be a peculiar phenomenon. How could 
Korean students become so active politically, and why do they 
oppose the governments so violently? What are the roles of 
political and interest groups in Korea? To answer these 
questions, it is essential to view the process of historical 
construction of the Korean student movement? that is, to 
examine historically how the student activism has been 
structured, and is presently structuring.
There are two extreme paradigmatic views in studying 
revolutions: the "pressure cooker theory" and the "conspiracy 
theory." The pressure cooker theory, which has a widely 
accepted set of explanations, refers to the image of a 
pressure cooker under which the heat has been turned up while 
the lid has been tightly clamped down. Unless the heat is 
turned down or a safety valve is opened to release some of the 
steam, sooner or later there is bound to be an explosion. In 
the simplest form of this theory, if the objective structural 
conditions oppress the people within a society, then a
4revolutionary event spontaneously occurs. In other words, 
given such circumstances under which people are constantly 
pressured, a rebellion naturally follows by "the frustrated 
and angry masses" (Gurr, 1970). Skocpol (1979:17) expresses 
this view through Wendell Phillips' statement that 
"revolutions are not made; they come."
The opposing view implies the purposive image; it is 
called the conspiracy theory. From this outlook, revolution 
is the product of dangerous radicalism driven by a minority 
group. Proponents of conspiracy theory believe that there are 
outside agitators or others who are few in number, and the 
focus is exclusively on certain limited types of political 
activities. This theory assumes that a small number of 
people, who are enormously influential, sow the seeds of, and 
make, revolution to take over political power.
This portrayal of two extreme theoretical approaches is 
meant to highlight radical contrasts about the presuppositions 
of human social action. The pressure cooker theory 
presupposes action which is mechanically determined; people 
are simply driven to rise when certain conditions are present. 
On the other hand, the conspiracy theory presupposes 
voluntaristic action; people freely choose what they do. 
Thus, in their extreme forms, the former tends to focus 
exclusively on the social structural side; the latter solely 
on the social action side.
It is self-evident that both theories are one sided; they
5reduce one to the other. But in reality, society is an
historical construction and an interplay of two sides. By two
sides, I mean the ways in which social action becomes social
structure, action in turn is shaped by structure, and
structure is, in time, transformed by action. Thus, we must
recognize both sides simultaneously: the process is a
dialectical relationship between action and structure.
"Social action and social structure create and contain one
another" (Abrams, 1982:108). So, it is fundamental for social
scientists to recognize that voluntaristic action has to be
preserved even while structural constraints are explained
(Alexander, 1982).
Therefore, neither theory is an adequate tool to approach
an understanding of revolution. Crane Brinton (1968:86) puts
it as follows:
Actually, we must reject both extremes, for they are 
nonsense, and hold that revolutions do grow from 
seeds sown by men who want change, and that these 
men do a lot of skillful gardening; but that the 
gardeners are not working against nature, but rather 
in soil and in a climate propitious to their work; 
and that the final fruits represent a collaboration 
between men and nature.
The major analytical problem of both theories, it seems to me,
is derived from the fact that revolution is understood as a
specific thing. It is, in my view, rather to be understood
as historical events and processes. An event is not a
structure or an object but a sequence of human actions
compressed in time. A process is not a static state but
6dynamic interplay of action and structure. Thus, revolution 
is to be understood essentially as a relationship, more 
specifically as an historical relationship. Huijian institution 
is not a fixed object. It is endlessly moving processes 
interweaving fact and meaning that construct, deconstruct, and 
reconstruct social experience. Regarding social action, the 
main agent of social change is the actor. One's action, then, 
—  whether one throws bombs or goes on a peace march, whether 
one protests about inequality or thrives on it —  depends 
largely upon "a matter of what previous experience has made 
possible and meaningful” (Abrams, 1982:3) for the actor.
Recently, there has been a significant amount of effort 
to examine revolutions in the historical context. For 
example, such works as those of Barrington Moore (1966), Eric 
Wolf (1971), and Theda Skocpol (1979) have contributed to this 
research in historical sociology. However, despite relative 
differences between these theorists, they have all focused 
primarily on structural conditions and the institutional 
consequences of revolutionary processes. For them, it appears 
that social action is elusive and remains a residual category. 
They treat the actual relational intentions of the parties as 
a factor of quite minor explanatory importance. For example, 
I doubt that one can explain thoroughly the French Revolution 
of 1789 without consideration of Louis XVI's actions with 
respect to the Third Estate, or the relationship between Louis 
XIV and his nobility a century earlier. As Abrams (1982: 190-
226) points out, what is needed is a "practical explanation" 
which gives more consolidation of "the general and particular" 
and also discreet consideration to colligating action and 
structure. This can be achieved, I believe, by leveling down 
their analytical focus to a middle ground.
The need for this "practical explanation" which can link 
the abstract and the specific makes it useful to begin at the 
ground level. The study of the process of a social movement 
is the first step in capturing the dynamic relationship of 
social action and social structure. To locate that general 
concern in concrete time and place, I chose the Korean student 
movement as the object of my analysis.
The examination of the Korean student movement could have 
led me to highlight a number of different issues. Questions 
of the dynamics of mobilization and its relation to political 
violence are of central importance. Equally fascinating is 
the issue concerning conflicts and resource mobilization among 
various groups arising within the context of political I
Iprocesses - particularly the role of the government and its [ 
related context within the international system. I consider _J 
the latter focus necessary and useful for a comparative 
historical generalization. For example, Brinton (1965), 
Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1978), even Marx and Engels (1982:287- 
323) have recognized and stressed the fact that a weak, 
confused, incompetent government invites or facilitates 
radical opposition to it. The ineptness of a government
should be understood in terms of not only the inability to 
mobilize historical resources but also what people perceive  ^
to be inefficiency or illegitimacy. However, it is desirable 
to sharpen the focus of the research to avoid a superficial, 
often times disqualifying presentation. One way of doing this 
is to concentrate solely on the facilitating factors of 
mobilization of the Korean students and its accompanying forms 
of violence in their activism. I have particularly
concentrated on the organizational structure and the role of 
ideology in the Korean student movement.
In undertaking this study, I am not espoused to a single 
school of sociological thought. Instead of bringing along a 
hypothetical point of view for testing, I am interested in 
some specific sociological questions concerning collective 
action and various forms of political violence. For instance: \
I
How does collective action develop? Is violence a necessary 
ingredient in political conflict?
Much of the theoretical context of my investigation is 
taken from the resource mobilization models depicted by k 
Oberschall(1973), Zald & McCarthy(1979), and Tilly(1979). At 
the same time, I have drawn on Georges Sorel's assertion about 
myth and violence. The work of many others, such as 
Dahrendorf's conflict theory, Braungart's theory of 
generational politics, and Berger and Luckmannfs theory on 
ideology also have provided useful insights.
However, some limitations of the resource mobilization
9model need to be recognized: that is, it is less concerned 
with the revolutionary (or movement) potential. Thus, it 
seems that the matter of how people's shared grievances, 
interests, or aspirations develop and change is not adequately 
explained. Its concern for the straight-forward assumption 
of individual action seems simply instrumental in relation to 
the collectivity. What Olson (1965) calls in his economic 
model a rational action is purely motivated by "selective 
incentives." According to this model, the balance of risk- ^ 
reward is the only motivational aspect in the mobilization of / 
collective action. In the situation of the Korean student 
movement, most ordinary students do not seem to be motivated 
solely by such incentives. It seems to me that the model 
minimizes the significance of the other aspect of human 
action, that is, nonrationality (of course, as opposed to 
irrationality). By nonrationality, I mean the subjective^ 
aspect of action which does not necessarily presuppose 
selective rewards, such as concern for freedom, equality, 
personal loyalty to the collectivity, sense of common [ 
identity, ideological awareness, etc.
Fireman and Gamson (1979) seem to capture this aspect 
with their attention to "solidarity," and they saw this as 
created and maintained as an organizational tactic in an 
attempt to preserve a collective good. However, having 
analyzed the data, I have come to the conclusion that 
solidarity is more than an organizational tactic by the
movement leaders. The elements have already prevailed in the 
culture. To put it differently, the leaders of a movement 
develop and extensively utilize those already existing 
elements within a culture in order to facilitate the movement 
process. For this reason, it is appropriate to examine this 
aspect in a broader cultural and ideological context.
Thus, the core of my discussion will revolve around some
within the context of the political culture of South Korea. 
To make it clear, my major concern is to identify facilitating 
factors that help to mobilize the groups of students. In sum, I 
the purpose of this study is not intended to answer the 
question of "why" Korean students revolt. Instead, I focus 
on the "how" of the movement. j
The following chapter foreshadows the outline of the 
theoretical argument itself. Explanations that the
development of the Korean student movement derives from any 
single variable such as anger, frustration, unemployment, 
etc. , are singly inadequate. It is the superimposed and 
vertically segmented structure of the student body, as well 
as a dense network of organization within it, that have easily 
facilitated the movement. Cultural factors such as shared^ 
identity and consciousness of community which enhance 
solidarity are equally important in facilitating the student 
movement, and serve to sustain the movement. Such cultural 
elements are likely to be perceived by members as being
aspects of the student movement organization and its ideology |
11
challenged in a changing society.
Before moving into the analytical dimension of my thesis, 
I have highlighted in Chapter Three the history of the Korean 
student movement for readers who are not familiar with the 
Korean student movement. Readers who are familiar with it may 
skip this section.
In the first section of Chapter Four, I have introduced 
the importance of segmented informal group organization which 
applies to much of Korean life. An overview of confrontation 
of the military and the student is also proposed. Particular 
attention has to be paid to the student cohort group formation 
in the following section. The rest of the Chapter presents 
a detailed examination of the internal mobilization process
of the Korean student movement. The movement has found iw 
easier to mobilize the student body because of the preexisting 
networks of intermediate, internal organizational structures^ 
The informal small groups, which are a dynamic part of 
cultural life in Korean society, have also helped greatly in 
facilitating the student movement. Particularly, when 
confronting the government control over the campus 
organizations, the Korean students develop clandestine small 
group "study-circle" cells to sustain their movement. It is 
with this primary group network in which each member is linked 
by means of strong, interpersonal bonds that Korean students 
are allowed to explore social issues and radical ideologies. 
As Henderson (1988:14) describes it, within this unit of cell
network all "plots against the authorities [are] cooked and
hatched." The central aim of the discussion in this Chapter
A  . . . .is to present the importance of intermediate organizational
structure in mobilizing the protest movement.7 This discussion 
also revolves around other factors concerning the cultural 
patterns and historical role of the students.
Chapter Five deals with ideological aspects of the 
movement. My argument is that: First, ideas are an important 
facilitating factor which give "focus and direction to any 
frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have, thereby 
bringing some unity of perception" (Rhyne, 1988:10). Second, 
they dichotomize the world into "us" and "them," so that the 
movement group is able to see clearly who stands athwart its 
path. Third, by being a believable call to action, what Sorel 
calls a "myth," it can provide hopes that through concerted 
action something real can be achieved. This discussion 
illuminates the idea that the Korean student movement is born 
out of hopes as well as frustration or anger. The essential 
point in this chapter is that the presence of ideas makes the 
Korean students able to create a more or less organized 
protest group, without which sustained violent confrontation 
would not have been possible. In the concluding chapter, a 
summarization of findings is presented with a brief comparison 
to the Indonesian and Chinese student movements.
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Quee-young Kim in his book, The Fall of Svnoman Rhee
(198 3) argues that it was discontent that drove the people to
rise against the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960. Many
segments of the Korean people in general during that period
supported the cause of the student movement against the
government because they were frustrated and angered by the
corrupt and unjust Syngman Rhee government. According to Kim,
the April revolutionary movement was "a natural and inevitable
event" growing out of the objective structural conditions of
an inherently conflict-ridden Korean society. As he puts it:
The Sa-il-qu [the April uprising] was indeed a 
socially creative act, neither accident nor miracle 
but a logical conclusion of conflict between social 
forces and political power. It evolved from certain 
structural conditions in which fundamental sets of 
social arrangement and power relations came into 
sharp contradiction and conflict with each other.
(p. 209)
As evidence for his argument, Kim suggests that the 
mobilization was for the most part spontaneous, when 
unemployed and free-floating people in cities, brought there 
by rapid urbanization, gave support to the opposition and 
participated in the protest demonstration, by which they 
ultimately transformed the movement into a violent revolt.
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According to Kim, the government created discontent among many
people because it "failed to deliver economic development and
employment" (p. 212).
Rapid urbanization congregated large numbers of 
aimless people in the cities. ... For those who had 
nothing, and even less to look forward to, a moral 
protest against the government seemed to represent 
their feelings. ... The concentration of the 
educated, the students, and the unemployed in the 
cities helped to transform the protest demonstration 
into a violent revolt. (Kim, 1983:211)
It seems that Q. Y. Kim's explanation is similar to mass 
society theory (Kornhauser, 1959), which posits that rapid 
economic change causes "social dislocation" that creates 
alienation and discontent in a large portion of the population 
and ultimately a predisposition to revolt. From this point 
of view, as Kornhauser (1959:39) characterizes it, mass 
society is seen as "a social system in which elites are 
readily accessible to influence by non-elites, and non-elites 
are readily available for mobilization by elites." In this 
mass society context, the intermediate structures become thin; 
on the other hand, the centralized bureaucratic organizations 
grow, so that "members of the society lack attachments to 
independent groups, the local community, voluntary 
associations, and occupational groups" (Kornhauser, 1959:90), 
which means they are alienated. As a result, it establishes 
the grounds of greater potential for political radicalism. 
By "a natural and inevitable event," Q. Y. Kim evidently means 
that from the point of view of mass society theory it was a
15
few oppositional elites who directly mobilized the
discontented and already available masses against the 
incumbent government. According to him:
Opposition leaders championed the challenge against \ 
the ruling elites, the intellectuals fermented it, 
the students acted out, and the masses followed.
(Q.Y. Kim, 1983:213)
Assuming Kim is correct in his contention that certain 
structural conditions drive people to rise, I then select, at 
least, an analytical problem when attempting to apply his 
theory to other times in Korea, not to apply it to other 
places. For example, if discontent is seen to be a sufficient 
factor in leading South Korea in 1960 into revolution, then 
should not that same rate of discontent, or a more magnified 
rate, lead her into revolution in other times? The problem 
can be seen in temporal terms. If it is argued that the rate 
of discontent is spread over a time, the question arises of 
how much of that factor must be present for the expected 
result to occur. Besides the temporal problem, the question 
must be asked of why particularly today and why not yesterday?
If discontent is the causal factor, its objective rate might i 
be greater in a feudal society than in an industrial one. 
This is the sociological problem that is left unexplained by 
Quee Young Kim's theory on the April uprising.
explanation inadequately overlooked was the mobilizing
potential and mobilizing effects of intermediate st
More importantly, what mass society theory and Q.Y. Kim's
(Oberschall, 1973:104-13). Q.Y. Kim did not deny the major 
role performed by the students in mobilizing the April 
uprising. So then, we have to ask: Why students? According 
to Oberschall (1973), given the political conditions, the pre­
existent networks of intermediate groups enhance the greater 
chances of mobilization of protest groups especially when 
those groups are superimposed and vertically segmented. It 
seems that Kim ignores the importance of the^ superimposed 
segmented structure of the student body, both compatible with 
a dense network of intermediate relations and high rates of 
students participation in them.^/ It was not aimlessly free- 
floating nonparticipants in intermediate groups who made the 
uprising possible but the students who already had 
organizational structures and high rates of participation in 
them.
All too often in their attempts to find causal factors 
for revolutions, all too often, sociologists tend to focus on 
a specific kind of variable that is considered necessary for
\ ■ i y
people or a group of people to react through violent 
confrontation. It seems that many theories, in order to 
explain revolutionary activity, have placed emphasis on some 
conditions which literally drive or push some identifiable, 
usually predictable group to act violently. No such 
variables, however, whether social, economic, political, 
psychological, structural, or processual, can sufficiently 
explain the phenomena in and of themselves. As I pointed
17
out earlier, it seems Kim's study on the April revolutionary
/
movement ignores factors that facilitate the process of the
1 1 movement. My question is why and how the Korean students have
effectively mobilized to protest and have played a major role
in the revolutionary movement? To answer it, in part, wej
should not neglect the fact that the student group is among
the few segmented collectivities (Oberschall, 1973) who
already have a dense and viable organization (Zald and
McCarthy, 1977) that can be easily mobilized to protest. It
ris thus necessary to identify and elucidate fthose
V
help to mobilize a group of people within the movement
organization. In other words, we need, as the first step, to
focus on the factors which can facilitate the student movement
or similar protests rather than cause them.
There is an ample body of research about revolutions and
various forms of political violence dealing with each on its
own terms. Given the diversity of general theories
(Zimmermann, 1983), it appears that the basic approach to an
intellectual problem is necessary for theoretical
clarification. ^Rhyne (1988) attempts to collapse all this
diversity into roughly two categories of theories which
capture the basic approach to this intellectual problem, and
presents them under two headings - "push" theories and "pull"
theories. According to Rhyne (1988:2):
By "push" theory, we mean the basing of an 
explanation on one or more conditions or factors 
which are seen as forcing, driving, or pushing some 
people or some social category toward revolution.
factors^ that
18
. . .By "pull” theory, we mean an explanation or model 
that emphasizes conditions or factors which 
facilitate the process of revolution.
The dichotomy of ”push" - "pull," as Rhyne pointed out,
may oversimplify many approaches to an intellectual problem.
This oversimplification may twist the nature of many existing
theories since very few are seen "purely as one type of theory
with no trace of the other" (Rhyne, 1988:2). However, it is
essential to make a distinction in an effort to seek more
comprehensive analysis of social and political movement.
Although the push factor may be relatively meritorious
in explaining certain revolutionary potentials, the primary
analytical problem of "push" theories is that they are
oblivious to cases which do not produce the expected results.
It is important to note that "extremely revolutionary
situations do not produce extremely revolutionary outcome"
(Tilly, 1978:198) /Then one must ask: How and why have South
Korean students played such a critical role in the political
opposition of the country while others have not? Why not
other organizations, such as trade unions, parties, peasant
groups, etc.? Are Korean students supposed to have more
grievances or be more discontented than other groups of
people? What do Korean students want to achieve?/ These
questions are why it is crucial to shift our attention to
elucidating the facilitating factors rather than identifying
causing variables. Rhyne thus contrasts these two approaches:
Just as the typical push theory takes for granted 
that a revolutionary process will necessarily follow
from the existence of the "cause" and, therefore, 
the process is itself not theoretically problematic, 
the typical pull theory takes for granted the 
structural or other conditions which fuel 
revolutionary frustration. What it sees as 
analytically problematic are not the angers and 
frustrations but those things which make it easier 
or even possible for any particular group of people 
to mount a revolutionary challenge to the existing 
regime. At the risk of oversimplification, J>ull') 
theory focuses on the how of revolution and ^ pusli/  ^
theory on the why. (1988:2) "
Karl Marx is one major intellectual who developed a push
theory. Marx saw revolution arising from the inevitable class
conflict in any society with private property. The class
conflict fundamentally grows out of the condition of economic
exploitation. It is thus predictable ultimately to bring a
revolutionary confrontation of the classes because the
exploited and oppressed under capitalism are "pushed" into
violent struggle with their oppressors (Karl Marx, Manifesto
of the Communist Party).
By contrast the currently most popular example of a pull
theory of revolution, the resources-mobilization theory, seems
not entirely content with exclusively facilitating factors.
Of course, this pull theory has its own problems, such as the
weak "explanatory power" and the unclear "critical variable"
(Goldstone, 1980:43 0-34). However, it gives its emphasis to
the segmentation or integration of a group and its concern
with the organizational density of movement groups in which
movements are engaged in the struggle for power within the
broader political process (Oberschall, 1973? Gamson, 1975;
20
McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly 1979). Oberschall (1973) 
points out, stressing the lack of vertical integration into 
the larger society that any collectivity segmented from the 
larger society, has the potential to become a protest group. 
It makes it easier for potential protest-group members to 
express hostility to the rest of the society and thereby 
increases the ability of that collectivity to organize 
protest. Group superimposition has the same effect on the 
organizing potential of a collectivity. As Dahrendorf 
(1959:213—23) discussed, group superimposition lessens cross­
cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest or 
loyalty to a more varied pool of people. Therefore, the 
members of a superimposed group are easier to mobilize; or, 
in Dahrendorf1s terms, the superimposed group or groups can 
move more easily from "latent" to "interest" group.
At comparable levels of segmentation and superimpositior . 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize the organizational 
coordination of resources which refers to a collectivity that
transform itself more quickly into a protest group. Tilly
(1978) also stresses, by suggesting the mobilization model, 
^the degrees of organization^ within a collectivity as an 
important factor in mobilizing collective action. According 
to Tilly(1978:62-84), solidary organization consists of 
"catness" and "netness," called "catnet" for short, which 
refers to both a shared identity in a group and the density
already has a dense, viable organizational structure that can
of networks that link each member by means of interpersonal 
bonds.1
p u 1
Given the facts above it seems to me that "pull" theories  ^
are more efficient in explaining the historical process of the 
Korean student movement. Nonetheless, I use the work of 
"push" theorists when pertinent. Although my general 
theoretical conceptions have been shaped largely by pull 
theories, it should not be concluded that all push theories 
are wrong. Both dimensions of "push11 and "pull" are aspects 
of the same reality; society always has two faces. It is 
"Janus-faced." It is my intention with this pull approach to 
capture the multi-dimensional aspect of the Korean student 
movement. My basic assumption here implies that the pull 
approach would be more reflective and meritorious in revealing J 
the actual process of the movement. This is the essential
1 One area of debate within the resource mobilization 
model has to do with how external resources should be focused 
on. External resources can refer to outside factors such as 
the favorable attention of media, socio-economic backgrounds 
of the participants, degree of support from the intellectual 
circles, and merger of other organizations and parties, etc. 
Both internal and external resources tend to closely relate 
to each other in the mobilization process. This study is
focused primarily on the internal mobilization of resources, 
but the external factor, particularly the socio-economic 
background of activists have become moot points in debate. 
Some argue that the student activists in Korea come mostly 
from disadvantaged families (Henderson, 1988:18). On the 
contrary, in fact, some student activists come from the very 
affluent families. According to survey research (H.S. Lee, 
1987:190-196), a large number of activists come from middle 
class family backgrounds. These external resources are also 
assumed to influence the mobilization process of the Korean 
student movement.
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step for a scientific study and eventually inclusive of push
factors. To put it differently, elucidating the process of
the Korean student movement is more appropriate than simply_
identifying causal variables of it.
In this respect, it should be noted that Marx (1948) also
-  -  ~ ~ N
paid some attention to \pull factors jsuch as enough urban 
concentration and sufficient unionization experience that 
would provide the basis for organized class action. As a 
recent example, Skocpol(1979) points out the importance of 
this idea. In analysis of agrarian structure and peasanl
insurrections, she shows that collectivities which already
have a dense, viable organizational structure transforms
easily and quickly into a protest groups, much more than do
those with little or no internal organizational structure.
According to Skocpol, the peasantry of France and Russia
played crucial roles in their respective early involvement in
the revolutions of 1789 and 1917 due to the pre-existence jaf
independent village organizations. By contrast, the Chinese
peasants got involved later in their revolution due to their
relatively weak village community organizations. As Skocpol
(1979: 114) puts it:
In France and Russia, peasants mobilized for action 
through traditional village community organizations.
In China, peasants first participated as traditional 
"social bandits" and then finally were directly 
(re)organized by the Chinese Communist Party.
Recognizing this importance of organizational structures,
what I wish to accomplish is to focus on some dimensions which
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can facilitate the Korean student movement. The goal of the 
present investigation is the same as that described by Rhyne 
(1988). Rhyne specifies three principal theoretical sources 
for identifying and elucidating pull factors, the first two 
of which will be used in this study. Those are: 1) resource 
mobilization theory which elucidates ”the interrelated idea
Vof the segmentation-integrating dimension of groups and 
density and nature of pre-existing organizational structures" ?
2) Georges Sorel's idea that "revolutionary action is 
facilitated by the presence of what he calls a( myth"; and 3) 
Crane Brinton's theme "that weak governments in trouble are
the likely targets of revolution" (Rhyne, 1988:7).
\
SOCIAL CHANGE AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DISCONTENT
Concerning the structural conditions or factors that 
might push people, such as economic condition, political 
oppression, discontent, frustration, angers, etc., one might 
vehemently argue that "a rebellion [revolution] cannot start 
from a situation of complete impotence" (Wolf, 1969:290). 
True enough, revolutionary organizations and ideologies are 
not produced from thin air. However, it is fundamental to 
note that, in a society as rapidly changing as Korea, and as 
subject to economic transformations (i.e., from agricultural 
to industrial), there is necessarily an enormous number of
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discontented people in all classes - this societal change 
ultimately 11 implies a society with some movement, instability, 
even volatility about it" (Rhyne, 1988:11).
When a society goes through a significant change such as 
urbanization and industrialization, it is very likely to 
experience a loosely co-ordinated social structure, which may 
erode the old structure, bringing a new one, for instance, a 
sudden increase in number of laborers or the urban poor. This 
societal transformation inevitably provides a susceptibility 
to emerging new forms of social groups, such as trade unions 
and a variety of other organizations that are able to mobilize 
various kinds of political pressure and influence. A 
confrontation among interest groups (for instance, the old 
elites vs. the new middle class or a set of groups) is likely 
to emerge, too. While each group may attempt to mobilize 
their resources to protect or enhance their interests, the 
state machines may become weaker in the process.2 Some may 
wish to topple the government, particularly when the 
government inefficiently and unfairly resolves the increasing 
conflicts. For example, with a sudden structural shift in
2 It is important to note that, unlike the traditional 
Marxist conception, the state is relatively autonomous from 
the control of the dominant class of a society. Skocpol 
(1979:2 4-33) portrays the state as an autonomous actor that 
has its own functions to perform. Thus, using state power to 
protect dominant class interests is not always inevitable. 
As she (1979:27) puts it: "states are potentially autonomous 
not only over against dominant classes but also vis-a-vis 
entire class structures or modes of production."
/?M
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Korea in 1945, after the independence from Japan, various 
newly emerging political groups (approximately 50 different 
factions) were competing to dominate political power.3 In the 
new Korean environment, society experienced a fierce struggle 
among these groups, and it grew worse with the rapid 
urbanization of the country. It is thus plausible to infer 
that after the collision is over the rest of the groups who 
were defeated in the struggle may feel discontented or 
possibly resentment toward the winner, especially when the 
game is perceived to be unfair. The rate of those feelings 
might be magnified if the winning group keeps suppressing 
them.
Actually, some historians tend to view the present 
political problem as primarily a result of the unfair 
resolution of the conflict among those groups by outside 
intervention in the first place. I am not arguing here that 
the 1960 uprising was the product of kinds of psychological 
deprivation or accumulated conflicts in large portions of the 
population.4 I simply point out that it may be possible to
3 Actually, it is most correct to say that there were 
three major powerful political groups which had collided to 
compete for power. These were landlords, nationalists, and 
communists. Syngman Rhee allied with the first group and 
succeeded in taking over political domination in 1948.
4 However, Cumings argues in his book, The Origin of the 
Korean War; Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes
(1979) , that the Korean War (1950) was the product of this 
kind of struggle. More accurately, the conflicts were already 
built up during the colonial era. So the struggle was 
necessary to achieve a political reunification and reintegrate 
the divided nation. But the United States Military Government
infer this precipitating condition in the context of rapid 
urbanization and a sudden structural shift. In any case, we 
must be careful when to argue on "an aggregate-psychological 
state" of population unless we find direct historical data 
"interviewed individually at the outbreak of, and recurrently 
during," (Skocpol, 1979:115) the uprising. Nevertheless, it 
may be safe to say that the structural condition of the 
changing society provides the most likelihood of conflicts 
among different groups.
South Korea for the last several decades has experienced 
an enormous change in almost every aspect of life, both in 
materials and values, most strikingly in the economy. For 
example, the GNP per capita, which was less than $100 in 1960, 
has increased to $2,870 in 1987. The rapid economic growth 
brought increased numbers into the working and middle classes, 
but the new classes were unable to have their own autonomous 
organizations.
According to Chirot (1986: 96-130), in the twentieth
century, unlike the time of early Western industrialization, 
an underdeveloped nation must have a strong state machine if
from 1945 to 1948 played the major role in tipping the balance 
against the Marxist left. He continues to argue that the 
battle was an effort for national unity, not another case of 
Soviet* s national expansionism. It seems to me that he is 
primarily concerned with being morally putative towards the 
U.S. interventionism into the Korean affairs, which condition 
is believed to cause revolution. Therefore, presupposing the 
revolutionary condition, Cumings tends to mythify the mass as 
a left counterforce against the right wing class and its 
supporter, the U.S. interventionist.
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it wants to have any chance for catching up with the advanced 
industrial nations. Chirot argues that the effort of 
industrialization commanded by a centralized bureaucracy 
inevitably brings the outcome of political repression (for 
example, the Soviet Union under Stalin). Therefore, the 
state's new despotic rule confronts "not only internal dangers 
but grave external dangers as well" (Chirot, 1986:124). In 
this regard, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan governments 
- with a strong centralized power during the last couple of 
decades - have successfully attained the economic growth. On 
the other hand, however, their economic achievements are 
exactly comparable to the result of serious political 
suppression. The government has implemented a policy of 
keeping the wages down and labor organizations weak, and in 
some cases allowed an exploitation of workers by unscrupulous 
employers. While the independent labor unions and political 
opposition groups were repressed, harassed and outlawed by the 
governments, only the student group could have maintained 
their relatively autonomous organizational structures./ This 
autonomous structural factor, in my opinion, made the students 
gain relatively important and rigorous status in political 
opposition in South Korea.
The industrialization of Korea has been achieved at the 
expense of political repression of civil rights, and has 
brought the perception of an ever widening gap between the 
poor and the rich. This has, in itself, provided more serious
issues for the student movement beginning in the 1970s.5 What
the students have been most concerned about is, among other
// ^  
issues, the unequal distribution of wealth. As they put it:
The challenge and task the people of this land in 
our time must embrace is the overcoming of the 
economical inequalities, political oppression, and 
cultural alienation, and the realization of 
reunification of the nation/people and democracy, 
by people who, as the subjects of history, work to 
achieve liberation.6
One may have to ask how bad the situation of income 
equality is presently in South Korea. According to a study 
on the growth of the Korean economy done by the Harvard 
Council on East Asian Studies (Mason, Kim, et al., 1980:444), 
income distribution among Koreans is fairly stable except in 
areas of business, high level managers, and professionals. 
Their conclusion is that overall the level of income 
inequality is relatively modest and equality of opportunity 
is high compared to other developing countries. In other' 
words, the performance of distribution of wealth in general 
is relatively good when compared to other countries, even to 
the industrialized nations (The World Bank, 1988:273). Then,
In 1970, failing to organize a trade union, an
industrial worker, Chun Tae-il committed suicide by fire 
crying "Observe the Labor Standard Law"; "We are not
machines"; "Let us rest on Sundays"; and "Do not sweat the 
laborers." Since then, some student movement leaders began 
to pay attention to the deplorable working conditions and
relatively low wages of the laborers resulting from the
industrialization of the country.
6 Source comes from an anonymous leaflet in reaction to 
the public prosecutor's report on the investigation of the 
Sammintu student organization in 1985.
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one might wonder why the Korean students negatively view the 
fact and latch onto the relativity issue by using such an 
absolute term as inequality. To this question, it is 
important to note that most Korean people (probably all 
Koreans) had long been equally poor in history. They have 
tended to share wealth collectively beyond class boundaries. 
The perceived gap of wealth and the better opportunity to 
upward social mobility for common people that a sudden 
industrialization brought have generated relative perception 
of poverty on an unprecedented scale. For example, the stark 
contrast of rapidly increased numbers of the urban poor and 
ever expanding high-income industrial sectors are truly 
apparent. This may have disrupted the historically enduring 
sense of economic egalitarianism.
Culturally, Korean's attitude towards poverty was not 
negative at all? in reverse, the selfish accumulation of 
wealth was viewed very negatively. Thus, the pauper was 
somewhat regarded as virtuous. For example, many scholars and 
some national leaders historically used to put themselves 
voluntarily in the state of the pauper as a self-discipline, 
and symbolically identify it as a moral uprighteousness. This 
means, in other words, that the ideal of the poor gentry is 
the respectable man of integrity. This value of economic 
prosperity as less important than morality functioned to 
lessen the psychological gap of social inequality and 
ritualistically enhance the sense of collective homogeneity.
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Because of this historical precedent, the inequality issue in 
the student movement has more to do with cultural factors than 
objective structural conditions. It is also necessary to give 
attention to a more or less strong egalitarian subculture on 
campus. Therefore, it is inadequate to understand the student 
movement in terms solely of a structural condition or of an 
organizational tactic of the movement group.
But, more importantly, this societal transformation has 
created "a structurally-induced collective biographical 
ambivalence” (Stanfield, 1988:class) which refers to a J 
situation in which their old cultural ways are breaking down 
yet the new ways of culture are still indistinct and 
ambiguous. This implies some degree of uncertainty or 
unpredictability, as the speed of change is too fast to grasp 
the new meaning of their changing cultural ways. In this 
ambivalent situation people are unsure as to where to be and 
how to act and more likely to define who they are in an effort 
to make value consensus - they may feel that their normal, 
routine, stable, old life is disrupted by newness or 
foreignness. The effort in search for new order may imply 
that it is itself a social movement or an incipient pre­
condition of one.
It is apparently true in Korea that there is a serious 
generational conflict (Hyo Sun Lee, 1987). Braungart (1984) 
contends that this generational gap may arise from ambivalent 
beliefs stemming from different historical experiences. The
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new values created by the active student body are not
compatible with the ones of the old generation. Their new
paradigm of world views of radical students create a sharp
conflict with the conventional one. The recent endeavor for
a new identity, which was materialized into "anti-Americanism"
emerged also as a unifying issue in the Korean student
movement, and is a good example of this changing paradigmatic
world view of the new generation.
The United States should not make Korea its 
subordinate country, but leave this land. ...The 
United States has supported the military regime 
which refuses democratization, social revolution and 
development and unification. In fact, the United 
States has brought about the permanent national 
division. We must resolve this problem for 
ourselves. Let us stage the anti-U.S. struggle to 
eliminate U.S. culture. (Recitation from Wonmo 
Dong, 1986:238. A leaflet distributed by a group 
of seminary students when they set the United States 
Information Service building in Pusan afire on March 
1982.)
Compared to the perception of the preceding generation 
toward the United States - such as a liberator, a peace 
keeper, a bloody ally, a democratic sponsor, etc. - the new 
generation’s perception is radically different. The new 
perception of the world of many students in the movement 
circle - whether it is wrong or right - is seriously 
challenging the traditional world views. However, the new 
outlook seems to have gained more sympathizers from the 
student population. In an endeavour to promote solidarity of 
the student body, various and diverse cultural programs were 
planned and undertaken by on-campus movement organizations in
•the 1980s. The vigorous cultural activity on campus in turn
reinforces the grounds for a unified and active student j
/
community and attracts the general student body into a
■
movement circle.
III. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The origin of the Korean student movement dates back to 
Confucian times (Yi dvnastv: from 1392 to 1910). During this 
period, students in the National Confucian Academy, which 
trained talented members of the gentry (yangban), commonly 
joined scholars in protesting to insist on a just government. 
The Confucian ideal of moral purity strongly abides with 
remonstrance obligations and reforming zeal. Thus, in 1450, 
student demonstrations protested against the Great King 
Sejong's alleged "soft-on-Buddhism" policies. In 1875, 
students joined scholars in their protest and remonstration 
against the dominant Prince Regent which led to his downfall 
(Henderson, 1988:7).
Under the Japanese colonialism, from 1910 to 1945, 
students were the chief activists for the Korean Independence 
Movement. For example, from the beginning of the Independence 
Movement in 1919 and onward, students not only played the 
activist role to mount nationwide demonstrations but also 
suffered the brunt of ruthless Japanese retaliation. (In 
average, 55 strikes of students occurred annually)
The liberation from Japan in 1945 brought active student
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demonstrations against Korean collaborators with the Japanese, 
and against many policies of the American and Soviet 
occupation. This specific period (1945-47) can be said to be 
an era of right-vs-left confrontation among intellectuals, 
students, and nationalists that was soon quelled by the 
emergence of the dominant post-war political paradigm, anti­
communism in South Korea.
During the 1950s, Korean students were largely mobilized 
for anti-communist rallies by the Syngman Rhee government. 
The students were organized and often mobilized by Rhee regime 
under the name of Anti-Communist Youth League in an attempt 
to counter-balance the challenges from the oppositional 
political parties in post-Armistice Korea.
The period of the student movement discussed above is not 
the direct concern of this research. However I present this 
to assist the reader in better understanding the historical 
role of the students in Korea (for detail, see Appendix I, 
Chronology of Student Movement in South Korea).
The 1960s brought great unrest and direct challenge to 
the ruling regime. The most famous student demonstrations 
occurred in April 1960 in Masan and Seoul in reaction to the 
ruling party*s rigging of the election of March 15 and the use 
of police violence to repress student protest. The discovery 
of the dead body of a young student in Masan harbour - 
apparently killed by police torture - inspired students in
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Seoul to protest the fraudulent presidential election. This 
student uprising in Seoul unexpectedly succeeded in toppling 
the confused and incompetent Syngman Rhee regime - Rhee 
resigned on April 29 - and eventually brought in the
parliamentary democratic regime of Dr. Chang Myon. However, 
the continuing student demonstrations advocating punishment 
of Rhee profiteers and demanding national unification under 
the Chang Myon government invited Park Chung Hee's military 
coup in May 1961.
The reemergence of student uprising against the 
establishment of relations with Japan in 1964-65 almost 
succeeded in ending the military regime of Park much in part 
because of the large number of participants; but Park 
immediately took a drastic measure against student 
demonstrations by stationing army troops on campuses and 
closing high schools and colleges. The student movement was 
confronted with an effective armed force of Park and was 
forced to go underground. Since the extreme "Yushin" 7 
measures, in 1972, banning virtually all opposition including 
student organizations and demonstrations, stringent campus 
controls and arrest and torture of student leaders by the 
Korean CIA, police, and even the military intelligence agency,
7 It is a major constitutional reform by Park Chung Hee 
regime; direct presidential vote has been replaced by indirect 
elections and made Park in effect "president-for-life." More 
detailed discussion will be presented in the following 
section.
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reinforced a cycle of violent hostility between Park Chung Hee 
and the students that lasted until his assassination in 
October 1979 at the hands of the director of the KCIA, Kim Jae 
Gyu.
During the post-Park era, demonstrations for 
constitutional revision, direct democratic elections, removal 
of martial law and the remnants of the Yushin system, 
intensified as students poured off the campuses into the
streets of Seoul and many other cities. On May 17, 1980,
Martial Law was extended throughout the country. This measure 
closed universities, prohibited demonstrations, reimposed 
prior censorship, and outlawed criticism and "rumors." All 
chief opposition leaders, including student leaders, were 
arrested as a result.
Students in Kwangju responded to the news of martial 
law by protesting in the streets. In response to this, "Chun 
Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, acting 
director of the KCIA, and new authoritarian leader,"
(Henderson, 1988:9) sent Special Forces (paratroopers) who put 
them down with brutality. The brutality brought about a 
general reaction of protest from the public, and the
protesters succeeded in driving the paratroopers from the
city. The demonstrators occupied the city of Kwangju for 
several days as a free zone until the 20th Division of the 
ROK-US Combined Forces, which was under the Command of the 
United Nations Forces, was sent to restore control of
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Kwangju.8 The 20 Division was removed by the Chun regime 
presumably without permission from the Commander (the United 
States Army General). This incident brought about a 
controversial argument among many intellectuals and students 
about the U.S. role in Kwangju. Student movement leaders, 
believing that the U.S. supported the Chun regime, have 
latched onto this incident and vigorously pursued it as a 
means of stirring anti-American sentiments.
The Chun regime maintained even harsher measures against 
the student movement. According to Cumings(198 6:159), "Some
15.000 protesters were arrested and placed in the reeducation 
camp" (so-called "Samchung Kyoyuk Dae") after the Kwangju 
insurrection. Under his brutal repression, student activists 
went completely underground to avoid governmental and 
professorial control and eventually formed well-organized 
secret networks, which has been effectively operated for 
recruiting and inculcating new members as well as for 
mobilizing demonstrations. In addition, their opposition 
goals marked a shift from democratic ideals to a revolutionary 
leftist stance. Unlike the previous movement, in the 198 0s 
leadership of the student movement has become organizationally 
clandestine, tactically subversive, and small group oriented, 
similar to a revolutionary vanguard party.
8 Religious and citizens groups concluded that as many as
2.000 persons had been killed during the ten day uprising. 
However, the government figure indicates less than 200. This 
is now under investigation by the National Assembly.
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In 1987, the federation of these underground small groups 
with inter-campus cooperatives successfully led the major 
demonstrations, under less radical agitation, by gaining great 
support from middle class citizens. These in turn led to the 
major constitutional changes of the ruling party's platform 
in June 29, 1987, of which the direct presidential election 
was a central issue. In the December election of 1987, Roh 
was elected with a 3 6 percent popular vote against a divided 
opposition.
Presently, student demonstrations against the Roh 
government continue with a new political issue, under which 
various movement organizations are united, that is, the 
"reunification of the Korean peninsula," a movement, they call 
for gaining "national identity."
IV. STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION
The Selected Groups in Social Organization
Before elaborating the specific mobilization of the
students, it is appropriate to highlight the importance of 
group organizations which run through much of Korean life. 
This theme is broader than the student movement. However, it 
is essential to a certain extent to understand the internal 
cohesive groups of the student cohort with which the networks 
are the dynamic facilitator in the movement.
There are three major social groups presently in South 
Korea: the first is the military which has profoundly
influenced the present social and political system; the second 
is comprised of the intelligentsia and students, and the third 
is the business community. Since the business community is 
not yet directly competing for political power, conflicts with 
the other two social groups have not been seriously
manifested.
It is the student group that has been active and
determined in opposing the military involvement in national 
politics (all governments since 1961 have been led by former
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generals) .9 It is said that primarily the intellectuals, who
are anti-military and who have been alienated from the 
military governments, tend to instigate students to protest 
against governments. But there has been little attempt to 
prove this contention empirically.
Nevertheless, these intellectuals, along with educated 
and ambitious young students, are likely to be dissatisfied 
by the military run governments. Much of the dissatisfaction 
results because a highly selective military elite occupies 
many influential positions in the governmental bureaucracy, 
in semi-public corporations, and in the government affiliated
percent of cabinet-level officials were former career military
officers11 during 1961-63, "42 percent in 1963-72," "32
percent in 1972-79," and "33 percent in 1979-88." From 1963
to 1986 former military officers comprised 15.8 percent of all ^
National Assembly members. However 42 percent of committee
chairman posts in the assembly were occupied by former
military officers. Steinberg(1988:8-9) continues:
Equally important, 39 percent of board directors 
(equivalent to vice ministers) of the central 
government ministries were from the military during 
the 1963-86 period. Also, mid-level officers were 
brought into the bureaucracy each year; by 1986 they 
totalled 686. The elimination of elected local 
government officials under Park Chung Hee in 1961 
allowed the appointment of military figures in 
critical local posts. For a number of years, most
9 There is a popular saying that goes: "If you want to 
see your son become the President, send him to the Korean 
Military Academy."
parties. According "more than
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provincial governors were from the military.
In this regard, it is plausible to infer that the favoritism 
toward military backgrounds in filling government posts has 
hindered social and political mobility opportunities for many 
intellectuals and enterprising young students. It can be 
inferred that such favoritism breeds alienation or discontent 
among many intellectuals and rising students.
Therefore, a major source of conflict between the
military and students can be seen in the struggle for avenues
• • • • 10to rise to positions of great authority, that is, competing
for power, both materially and ideally.11 Park Chung Hee used 
to vehemently attack student activists and intellectuals12 who 
criticized his government, implying they are at the root of 
political instability. On the other hand, students and those 
politicking intellectuals used to denounce the military 
regimes as morally disrespectful governments.
10 • • • •It can be argued that it is no coincidence that
demonstrations are more frequent and active in the most
prestigious universities in Seoul, such as Seoul National 
University, Yonse University, Korea University, Sunggyun Kwan 
University, etc., and that they have taken leading roles in 
the Korean student movement.
11 Quee Young Kim (1983:217) presents the ironic fact that 
"so many of the leading figures of the movement later became 
spokesman for a very extreme form of authoritarianism.11
12 In 1975, Park Chung Hee expelled en masse the 
politically active professors on campus who frequently
criticized the government and those sympathetic toward the 
student movement.
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This is not to say, of course, that every member of each 
group engages in conflict. Membership of both groups are 
somewhat cross-cutting because every male Korean one way or 
the other directly associates with the military (military 
service is compulsory for all Korean men). For example, it 
is not an unusual scene in a demonstration to witness students 
throwing rocks and molotov cocktails, even as their friends, 
classmates, and even some of their brothers enlisted by the 
riot police try to subdue and disperse them. But such
diffused loyalty is not common in South Korea's elite society, 
for Koreans tend to develop loyalties to their collectivity 
(particularly school loyalties) with close personal ties that 
have a strong bonding effect on elite society. For example, 
Park Chung Hee was from the second class of the Korean 
Military Academy (KMA); one of his prime ministers, Chung II 
Kwon, and the Director of KCIA, Kim Jae Kyu (who assassinated 
Park), were his classmates. Park's colleagues in the 1961 
coup (such as Kim Jong Pil) were from class eight. Chun Doo 
Hwan was from class eleven; Roh Tae Woo, the present Korean 
President was Chun's classmate.
Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that the power 
of the entire military is centered on a single elite group. 
There are several other fragmented factional groups within the 
military having to do with different social and geographical 
backgrounds. But they are less powerful than the particular 
group, that is, the exclusive fraternal group of Korean
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Military Academy graduates. The Korean pattern of interaction 
is still largely operated by primary and intimate relations 
rather than secondary.13 Groups are generally formed on the 
basis of family relations among those of similar educational 
and geographical backgrounds. These groups are seldom formal 
or institutionalized. They function rather informally with 
emphasis on mutual help and obligation among members by 
creating an abiding sense of allegiance. The members of these 
informal groups meet together often and exercise a great deal 
of power and influence on each other. Regarding this, 
Steinberg (1988:5) states: "Because nearly all officials went 
through the KMA, the military elite is probably the single 
most effective and cohesive organization in contemporary/7 
Korean society." Thus, Korean Military Academy graduates are 
closely bound to each other and play a critical role in 
shaping government authority.
In a similar fashion for students, school loyalties and 
small factional groups create close personal bonds among 
themselves (study circles comprised from those from high 
school classes and between university upper classmen and 
incoming freshmen) form an important student subculture on 
campus and become critical elements in mobilizing protest
13 For more detail on the Korean pattern of interaction, 
see a case study done by Vincent S. R. Brandt, A Korean \ 
Village (1971). The author provides an excellent presentation 
of Korean factionalism, regionalism, and interpersonal/ 
interaction.
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groups. By and large, it is the peculiar characteristic of 
Korean people to build loyalties to their own internal group 
with strong emotional ties among members. These various small 
factional groups are also competing for hegemony within each 
social collectivity. Thus, in short, it is important to note\ ^  
that complying with collective norms and subordinating) 
individual interests to the group one belongs to are peculiar! 
cultural and behavioral patterns among most Koreans.
The Mobilization Process of the Students
As previously discussed, resource mobilization theory 
assumes that people cannot simply engage in sustained 
political action unless they are part of at least minimally ° 
organized groups. Thus, the theory argues that any 
collectivity might become a carrier of a protest group, 
especially when it exists segmented from the larger society. 
According to Oberschall(1973:ch.4), the lack of vertical 
integration into the larger society has the organizing 
potential of a collectivity. In other words, "anything which 
isolates a collectivity from the larger society, or the larger 
society from it, helps create conditions which make easier the 
task of changing of the collectivity (or portion thereof) from 
an aggregate of like-minded people to a mobilized movement"
(Rhyne, 1988:7). Also, as developed by Dahrendorf (1959: ch. 
VI), if a group is superimposed, it reduces the likelihood of 
cross-cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest 
or loyalty to a more diverse group of people. As a result, 
it is "likely to increase the violence of class [group]14 
conflict" (Dahrendorf, 1959:217). As Rhyne (1988:8) describes 
it:
. . . two groups are superimposed when the boundary 
of one is coterminous with that of another, when all 
members of Group Alpha are also members of Group 
Beta, and vice-versa. Such superimposition reduces 
the likelihood that members of any group would have 
different combinations of ties to other groups, 
thereby diffusing potential loyalties in many 
directions. In contrast, since the members of a 
superimposed collectivity have fewer conflicting 
loyalties, they are easier to mobilize?...
In this respect Korean students are seen as a striking^
example of what the resource mobilization model proposes as
a collectivity easily mobilized because of the isolation from
or the lack of close integration into the larger society. The
large student collectivity, which is a product of modern
Korean education, contributes not to only group
superimposition but also segmentation, by which students are
given their own social status and distinctive social roles..
In other words, the modern school setting provides a segmented j
demographic aggregation of young people who are under lessons, I
14 Dahrendorf explains the concept "class" in terms of 
"the differential distribution of authority." Here I would 
like to use the term "group" instead of class, which is a more 
specific and appropriate term for this study.
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separated from the rest of the world, learning the ideals of 
justice and democracy and being expected to always uphold 
these principles. Moreover, the concept of the youth of 
modern Korea is not the same as the youth in the Confucian era 
during which the age of fifteen was considered the age of 
entering adulthood. The period of youth has been greatly 
extended in the modern era.15 So, unlike their previous 
generation, they have been barred from taking over adult 
responsibility which means that they are, in general, 
relatively free from the usual obligations of life and social - 
responsibility.
But the most important thing in the structural 
characteristics of the student body is the ease with which \ 
they can influence each other, including a shared identity, 
thus providing a potential resource base for a movement. In 
other words, their perception of the world can be easily 
affected by their peers' cultural and political orientation.16 
That is, students are a congregation of a large number of 
cohorts who share some common characteristics and collective
15 There are somewhat conflicting expectations toward the 
youth in Korean society and family. Socially they are 
considered in a collective sense to be a protege, yet, at 
home, in many cases, they are expected to behave as an adult.
16 For a reference, we need to give attention to Newcomb's 
famous Bennington study (1943) which refers to how the college 
life can be an important cognitive changing experience. His 
study reveals that the freshmen from Republican family 
backgrounds exposed to the liberal culture of Bennington 
College tended to change their political views.
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sentiments created by their own subculture./ Thus, according 
to Braungart (1984:350), given a particular set of historical 
circumstances, an age cohort can be "transformed into a 
generation when its members are aware of their uniqueness, 
feel a sense of solidarity, and join together to become an 
active force for social and political change."
Unlike American college students, Korean students are 
rarely allowed to transfer from one school to another; once 
they get into a school, they have to remain at the same school 
for four or more years. If one wanted to transfer, one could 
retake the entrance exam and start as a freshman again at 
another school.17 This structural fact facilitates the
process of creating a sense of belonging and of enhancing the 
collective consciousness of the students. It provides the 
subjective anchoring point of where they belong, what they are 
and who they are. Since they are both structurally and
culturally homogeneous, it can be assumed that they cling 
together on campus by the presence of what Khaldun (1967) calls 
a "group feeling" which refers to moral and cultural^ 
superiority over another.
In addition, the student population^was rapidly growing 
during the most turbulent period. For example, college-level
17 The Far Eastern Economic Review (Paul Ensor, 15, Jan. 
1987:34) reports that in 1986 "besides the 700,000 high school 
students...," "another 100,000 were retaking the exam either 
after attending two-year colleges or after completing 
correspondence courses."
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institutions in Korea from 1948 to 19 60 doubled, "rising from 
31 to 62" and the college student enrollment increased "from
24,000 to 97,819." Secondary schools similarly increased from 
97 in 1945 to 357 in 1960. "By 1962, there were almost four 
times as many high school students as in 1945" (Henderson, 
1968:170). In 1987, college institutions reached 115, and 
the number of Korean college students "reached 1.3 million, 
almost a fivefold increased over 1978" (Wonmo Dong, 1988:B2).
The resource-mobilization model calls attention to the 
degree of organizational density found within a collectivity 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). As comparable to superimposed 
segmentation, "that collectivity which already has a dense, 
viable organizational structure will transform itself more, 
quickly into a protest group or revolutionary protagonist than 
will one with little or no internal organizational structure" 
(Rhyne, 1988:8). j^Given the resource base and given the dense V 
and viable organization within the student body, it is not j 
difficult to infer that the Korean students, as a superimposed I 
segmented group, have a relatively easy chance to mobilize the 
already existing organizations within their school structureTj 
It is very important to recognize that the very organizational 
structure of the student body, mobilized frequently by the 
Syngman Rhee regime for anti-communist rallies during the 
1950s, ironically turned against that regime at a particular 
historical and political event, the unfair presidential 
election of March 15, 1960.
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Quee-young Kimfs study about the 1960 student uprising 
clearly implies that these organizational structures had 
helped enormously in facilitating the movement. ^/^The 
demographically isolated and physically mobile student body 
was already available at any time for political and social 
mobilization by any factions. ^ The only things that it needed 
were the right cause and the leader for them to mobilize their 
resources.^) For example, the small number of students in Taegu 
protesting the unjust election in 1960 captured the attention 
of the mass media and were portrayed "as a source of moral 
purity and national consciousness" (Kim, 1983:211), 
particularly when their actions were viewed against the 
historical tradition of the heroic action of students against 
Japan. It seems that this mass media focus accelerated the 
process of mobilization, winning support from other student 
majorities of other parts of the country.
However, given the latent cause to mobilize, the elected 
student chairman of the College of Political Economy at Korea 
University in Seoul, Yi Se-ki was not personally interested 
in mobilizing the students for demonstrations? he was rather 
afraid of the potential risk of his involvement in it. But 
he and his officers of the student association felt a great 
deal of pressure from a student body that was indeed 
concerned. The following questions were asked of Yi Se-ki by 
some students: "Don't you think that we should do something? 
Otherwise, we will be nothing. How can we face the people?
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The fate of our nation is at stake" (Recitation from Q.Y. Kim,
1983:77). Yi wrote later reflecting upon the situation prior
to the demonstration on April 18, 1960.
Everytime I ran into these guys, I was forced into 
a corner to answer these questions. I would mumble 
a bit and avoid the situation as best I could. But 
they were persistent and even threatening. I was 
afraid that they would rough me up if I didn't do 
something very soon. (Recitation from Quee-young 
Kim, 1983:77)
One might possibly wonder: What do other organizations, 
such as labor unions, political parties, peasant 
collectivities, other independent interest groups do in that 
situation of political crisis? As I mentioned earlier, when 
we look at the political processes of South Korea 
historically, union activity and other kinds of organizational 
political activities were severely suppressed, and, under the 
powerful dogma anti-communism. all too often were viewed as 
pro-Soviet (Henderson, 1968 and Cumings, 1986). South Korean 
governments have not been inclined to tolerate any independent 
organizations, particularly those groups such as farmers, 
laborers, teachers, etc. that are likely to oppose government 
policies on behalf of their occupational interests. An 
enduring pattern of repression was thus established, and it 
served to weaken political opposition. The result is that 
society has experienced a relative lack of organized interest 
groups, except in the commercial and industrial sectors. 
Since the labor unions and political groups were repressed, 
harassed, and outlawed, student groups have gained a
relatively more important political role since then.
Due to the continuing historical role in political 
opposition, the Korean students have obtained a recognized 
identity, that is as the "nation's conscience." This label 
has assigned to them as the patriotic voice of the country. 
This kind of fame has traditionally ridden on their role as 
the morally upright in the Confucian era; as the heroes of the 
struggle under Japanese rule; and as the advocates of 
democratic ideals in domestic politics. This historical 
symbolic definition of moral purity18 has given the students 
the privilege of providing support or criticism of the central 
government.
Furthermore, this shared identity as bearers of the 
"nation's conscience," acquired through the historical 
processes, continually imposes upon the individual a self­
definition that coincides with the symbolic and historical 
experiences. And the students are, in the eyes of others, 
expected to maintain the identity and to reconstruct the 
historical meanings creatively in the communal context by 
assembling potential resources. This labeling effect, in my 
opinion, greatly works to facilitate the movement. One 
protester at Seoul National University responded to an
18 Henderson (1988:5) contends that the traditional-ridden 
elitism (Confucian origin) among students is one of the 
important abiding themes of the student movement in Korea 
along with two other themes. Those are "nationalism" and 
"equity."
American reporter: "Because we're students, we have the
privilege of being involved in politics." "We must do our duty 
to reform society." Most Korean students like himself believe 
that they have "a responsibility to push government and 
society" (Recitation from Gittelsohn, June 24, 1987:33-34;
underlines are mine to emphasize his taken-for-granted 
assumption of "weness"). They see themselves as carrying on 
a long tradition of dissent to the spoils of power. This 
shared sense of identity, formed by historical processes and 
culturally rooted into the structure, in turn, motivates 
individuals to participate in the movement.
^Because of this shared sense of cultural identity, 
attempts to mobilize the student movement have been relatively 
easy for the leaders, albeit it was loosely organized. The 
mobilization efforts have been made mostly through the formal 
student organizations. During the 1960s and most of the 
1970s, there were no standing movement organizations separate 
from the formal body of student associations. Most 
demonstrations were organized by the duly elected student 
leaders, and the causes were based on the contemporary 
political issues. Thus, the characteristic of the student 
movement was more or less temporary and somewhat transitory; 
their ideology was not yet distinctively articulated. Their 
zeal was fundamentally oriented toward reform rather than 
revolution, but it was throughout a basically anti-government 
movement. In other words, when facing the government's
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repressive measures and the issue became out of date, the 
movement weakened and soon disappeared. The student leader^ 
who was often duly elected with strong support from his 
friendship circles, could easily pull resources and facilitate 
the demonstration movement without extensive brooding over t 
long term tactical and effective planning. Viewed as a 
representative of the student body, the elected student 
president has been ascribed a symbolic status to be a leader 
of the student movement as well, one who should be able to 
carry on the tradition of historical identity. He then, armed 
with moral ideas, simply mobilizes the existing formal student 
organizations, manufacturing the cause to rise according to 
the issue that was perceived to be important. Once a person 
succeeded in successfully mobilizing a number of student 
followers, he tended to receive attention from both the 
government and the opposition group. In some cases, the 
government, often through either coaxing or threatening by the 
KCIA, allegedly used to offer the student leader a job or 
bribe in an attempt to nullify the movement circle. Few 
actually took the offer, and some refused it and chose a path 
in pursuance of a career in an opposition political party.19
Returning to the dynamics of group life, informal small
19 This is a moot point to debate. However, it can be 
developed into a hypothesis that the motivation of the student 
leader is to establish the basis of his political career after 
graduation. The source of data comes from interviews and the 
personal experiences of observing a circle of movement group 
when I was in Korea before 1985.
groups, fraternal friendship circles, are pervasive in a 
peculiar way within any collectivity of Korean society. There 
are undoubtedly several small factions on campus who are 
competing with each other to put their own member in the 
presidential post of the student government in order to take 
over hegemony of power on campus. At the least, they try to 
gain influence upon it by federating their groups and by 
attracting the normative support from the mass student body. 
Meanwhile, they can effectively mobilize the resources 
whenever they need and want to. All too often, out of 
friendship circles and social networks, a student leader duly 
elected with the support of his members to be a representative 
of the student government becomes the leader of the movement
as well. Kim (1983:2 07) shows how these small groups ofTl
l\
friendship networks in 1960 facilitated the movement and , 
succeeded unexpectedly in toppling the Syngman Rhee 
government.
However, there were times of serious trials for the 
formal student organizations in Korea when the government put 
campuses under systematic surveillance by the secret police 
and banned all autonomous student organizations. The harsher 
control over the student movement began at the so-called
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• 20 * •Y u s h m  reform measure of 1972, which banned virtually all
opposition including student organizations and demonstrations.
Since then, the "Student Defence Corps" which the government!
set up had become the only legally recognized campus student
organization. The repressive measure had continued and
intensified until Park's assassination in October 1979. For
example, one unit of underground students in 1974 issued a
"Declaration on the People, Nation, and Democracy," and were
arrested with other intellectuals and clergy who were
supposedly connected to those students. Surprisingly, among
those, several students received a death sentence (however,
they were released later).
During the early 1980s, except the spring of 1980 (a 
short while after Park's death), the student movement was 
again put under repressive measures of the Chun Doo Hwan 
government. The autonomous campus student organizations were 
disbanded to be replaced by ones controlled by the government 
and administration. Moreover, "college presidents and 
administrators were required to suppress student activism - 
through suspension, expulsion, and otherwise - and were 
discharged if they failed to do so" (MacDonald, 1988:92). 
Even the officially approved social activities on campus were
2A • • • •The human rights report issued by Asia Watch describes 
the Yushin system as "the style of traditional monarchy." 
Park Chung Hee "ignored the legislative process and the 
National assembly altogether and adopted the tactic of issuing 
decrees" (Asia Watch, January 1986:16).
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severely restricted and regulated. The Asia Watch (1986: 93-
4) reported on its control that the government used:
...spies and informers in the guise of students and 
maintained a police presence on campus with both 
uniformed and plainclothes men stationed outside 
administrative and other offices on campus. The 
government set up its own controlled campus student 
organization, the student corps for National Defence 
(Hakto hoguktan  ^ right after the Kwangju incident 
in 1980 and forbade the free organization of any 
other independent student associations. All 
decisions of the Hoguktan including budget were 
controlled by the Student Guidance Committee (Hakkvo 
Chido Wiwonhoe), a branch of the all-university 
central Guidance Committee. No student with any 
record of participation in a demonstration or 
disciplinary action could be elected head of the 
Hoguktan.
The Washington Post (June 4, 1981) reported on the campus
scene in the early 1980s as follows:
At some points on the campus of Seoul National 
University, there were more agents than there were 
students.
Under these harsh measures, the movement circles went 
completely underground to avoid government and professorial 
control. They settled into cells - so called underground 
"study-circles" which have existed as the unit "in which 
social issues, radical and illicit ideologies, interpretations 
of Korean society, economy and history are explored and plots 
against the authorities cooked and hatched" (Henderson, 
1988:14). This unit seems rather natural, as Henderson 
(1988:14) points out, to "a small-group-oriented Korean 
society." It is also important to note that the various 
legally approved circle (club) activities as an extra­
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curricular program on campus are part of the student culture 
which have persisted throughout much of the history of the 
student movement and influenced it greatly. The study circle 
- whether underground or legalized - functions as a netw^^
campus subculture of circle activity is rigorously maintai
by the majority of students. According to surveys conducted
at Korea University in 1983 and 1985:
Nearly half the students said they spent their free 
time at school with fellow course members and 
classmates? a third spent it alone, mostly for 
study. Only 2 percent spent it with members of the 
opposite sex. A little more than a quarter of the 
students said they spent their after-school time 
with friends and classmates? nearly the same number 
studied in the library? about one in eight went 
home, and about the same number went to "circle" 
(equivalent to club or society) gathering or 
activities on campus. (Macdonald, 1988:89)
Those students who went underground were or became
radical and maintained well-organized secret networks, through
which they recruited and indoctrinated new members as well as
organized small-scale but tactical demonstrations. According
21 The campus experience is quite unstable to many young 
students, since many of them come from traditional family 
backgrounds which are very intimate but at the same time 
authoritarian. In the rapidly changing society, many young 
people confront a generation gap within the family. This 
brings a lack of communication with their authoritarian 
father. Also moving into the impersonal and egalitarian, 
somewhat freer campus setting, they confront a sudden personal 
crisis. As a result, it is rather natural to many students 
to join a small group cell in order to gain a support system 
from their peers. At the same time the campus setting 
provides a good place to meet like-minded people.
of support systems among many students in which they 
easily find their own friendship groups.21 Thus, the
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to a report in 1981:
Sporadic small-scale protests continue to erupt on 
several of Seoul's college campuses but the wave of 
larger demonstrations that spread over them last 
week seems to have subsided under heavy government 
pressure and warnings that the universities may be 
closed down. (The Washington Post. June 4, 1981)
Despite the effort of the Chun government to terminate student
unrest, the new form of small-scale tactical demonstrations
has surfaced instead of a large-scale mobilization. It seems
to me the trend of underground student networking changed the
course of the Korean student movement in the 1980s. The Chun
government apparently failed destroy the small group
communication network of the student body. The students*
protest mobilizations in the 1980s have become far more
effective tactically and better articulated ideologically than
previous ones in the 1960s and 70s.
One might then wonder how new members were recruited into
the underground movement circles in the highly risk-involved I
circumstances under government pressure? Many new members
seem to be recruited through the connection linked to one's
juniors in high school.22 However, the other conventional way
is going through the departmental or legally approved circle
activities. For example, there are various kinds of social
gatherings on campus, particularly the legalized circle
meetings which are operated to stimulate student's extra-
22 This topic needs to have an in-depth interview 
research. My description can be an overview of a part of the 
recruitment process.
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curricular activities. Such circles vary from philosophy to 
sports. These are, to name a few: folk song study, Kant
study, mask dance study, classics study, science study, 
traditional art study, poets, guitar players, mountain 
climbers, theatrical performers, existentialists, soccer 
players, etc.
Among those circles, some operate underground systems 
that intensively train in a separate course a small group of 
members who are politically like-minded. The new members are 
normally recruited during the open membership training 
sessions or seminar presentations. Often, outstanding 
figures who are politically concerned and who have good 
friendship circle are likely to be recruited by their senior 
members. The new members are accepted into a small 
clandestine group raised with a strong sense of obligation and 
comradeship. They share the same feelings, study, and discuss 
together various topics to build solid ideological orientation 
and to acquire organizational tactics as well. The 
ideological training for the members is supposed to be toward 
praxis rather than metaphysical. When the trained individual 
reaches the third year, he normally has to choose one of two 
alternatives: whether to go for activism or for training new 
members. Supposedly, he goes out to form a new study-circle. 
In actuality, he is responsible for nurturing his group to
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maintain the tightest membership.23 Each group joins the 
special membership training that is carefully conducted with 
massive readings of leftist literature, consolidating their 
ideology in which each member knows only his own superior and 
a few intimate comrades.24 They also participate in the open 
membership training for a larger number of students from 
departments or legalized circles, which is offered during the 
vacations, often occurring in rural areas with the intention 
of raising consciousness of farmers and helping them to 
organize. The Chun government, however, banned the summer 
activity because of their connection to the farmers.
The failure of the Chun government to crush the small 
group informal structure of the student movement circle may
ibe attributed to the culturally inherited small-group-oriented \| 7^^-t
— - " — _ —   ~~ • - i\ r f 1 ‘T j r p i
nature of Korean society. The police reported in 198 6 that 
there were 72 such underground cells at 22 universities in 
Seoul. Yet most of them were only "under the umbrella of 
Chamintu and Minmintu. two radical underground organizations 
which were formed in mid-1986" (McBeth, 1987:31-3). 
Nevertheless, the new trend of forming underground cells was 
not limited to on-campus. That is, the students formed
""i '
bk-iU
0/<f
if'
23 Among students this cell is called a "family" or a 
"team."
24 They also operate a system in which each study-circle 
dispatches a member to other group to connect cells in an 
effort to improve the solidarity of the movement. The leading 
group in mobilizing demonstrations among these study-circles 
on campus is often called the "head family."
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connections with Christian churches and other religious 
organizations in order to avoid repression on campus. This 
tie with religious groups allowed students safer places to 
gather off campus and somewhat better protection from the 
police. In addition, this underground movement was widely 
accompanied in the movement circle with the so-called 
"conscientization movement" (Uisick-Hwa Undona) which may 
refer to a movement to raise the consciousness of 
individuals.
When the government relaxed its controls over students ^
i
in 1984 (the so-called "Campus Autonomy Measure"), these, 
segmented, dissociated circles banded together to form a 
federal group? for each had "a reason to join with the others 
to form a federation representing the large group as a whole" 
(Olson, 1965:63). For example, on April 17, 1985, the
National Federation of Student Association (Chonhakvonl was 
organized out of this study-circle cell network. Under the 
federation, the political standing organization, Sammintu was 
set up to coordinate the effective demonstration movement 
through mobilizing underground and semi-underground small 
study-circle cells linked with inter-campus cooperatives. The 
revived autonomous student organizations on campus also 
brought greater strength and faster and effective 
mobilization. Since then, the frequency of demonstration has 
been remarkably increased. According to the Ministry of 
Culture and Information announcement in Oct. 20, 1985, "419
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demonstrations had occurred involving 76,000 students from 71” 
universities since March. There also had been "255 labor 
disputes from January to October" (NACHRK, Korea 188. 
1988:37).
The key student demonstration occurred in May 1985 when 
seventy-three students from five universities in Seoul staged 
a three-day sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building, 
demanding that the U.S. issue an apology for what they called 
"U.S. involvement in the Kwangju incident"(NACHRK, 1988:36). 
This was a tactically successful protest to draw public and 
world attention (through mass media) to the sensitive 
political issue of South Korea. Embarrassed by this protest, 
the authority of the government responded with a thorough 
investigation of the student federation with the intention of 
wiping out the leading activists. As a result, Sammintu was 
disbanded through the arrests of its leading members.
Even if its leadership is decimated by arrests and the 
organization is destroyed by frequent government suppression, 
successors survive from the underground study-circle cells. 
For example, the Sammintu. destroyed after the three-day 
occupation of the United States Information Service building, 
was followed by the two new movement organizations, the
Chamintu and the Minmintu.25 They soon engaged in an intensive 
ideological argument. Competing to attract the support from 
the masses, the two groups became increasingly radicalized. 
They also competed to put their members in the presidential 
post of student governments. However, because of their 
radicalized character, both groups failed to obtain strong 
support from the mass body of students. For example, during 
the 1987 election at Seoul National University for the student 
associations, the candidates with revolutionary slogans were 
not able to receive many votes.26 The Chamintu acknowledged 
this, and changed to more moderate slogans for direct national 
presidential elections and formed the "Patriotic Students' 
Pan-National Federation for Struggle against Foreign Powers 
and Dictatorship." On the other hand, the Minmintu rigidly 
maintained radical agitation advocating to form the "People's 
Constitution Assembly." As a result, some member universities 
left the Minmintu organization. Under less radical agitation, 
the movement by Chamintu successfully led the major 
demonstrations by gaining great support from middle class 
citizens as well in June, 1987, and these in turn led to the 
major change of the ruling party's platform on June 29, 1987.
25 The headquarter of Chamintu was known to exist in Seoul 
National University, and the Minmintu was in Sunggyun Kwan 
University. Both have member universities, however, individual 
members through small groups are scattered around all 
campuses.
26 A report from "The Christian Institute for the study 
of Justice and development," Seoul, Korea, March 1987.
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In the wake of Roh's political relaxation, the student 
movement has shifted from the democratization issue to 
reunification and anti-Americanism. The Chamintu and the 
Minmintu organizations have been succeeded presently by other 
different regionally associated groups.27 However, under the 
banner of national reunification, the student activists seem 
to agree in uniting under the "National Federation of General 
Student Councils," formed in August 1988.
One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1980s1 
student movement is that the students allied with 
intellectuals, workers, farmers and other religious groups to 
form a strong opposing force to the governments. Needless to 
say, the major demonstration of June 1987 was a product of 
this al 1 iance. However, it was more than one group with 
others: It was accompanied with the movement of the so-called 
"Into the Workers" (Shim, 1986:36). Student activists 
secretly crept into industrial plants to become assembly-line 
workers in an effort to organize labor unions. They generally 
obtained employment by disguising their educational 
backgrounds on the application forms. Their numbers 
(including both college graduates and expellees) in 1986 were 
"conservatively estimated to be about 1,500." "In 1985, 321
27 For example, the Minmintu was succeeded by the Sogonchu 
and the Chamintu by Sochonavon. In addition, various regional 
federations were formed: for instance, Chunnam, Chunbuk,
Chunju, Wonkwang, and Woosuk Universities formed a "Honam 
Student Federations."
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'disguised employees' (former student activists) were fired 
by their employers. During the first five months of 1986 
alone, 350 student activists-turned-workers were dismissed 
from their jobs for having misrepresented themselves by 
underreporting their educational backgrounds on application 
forms" (Wonmo Dong, 1987:247) Those students were often
accused of being communist labor organizers by the government.
28As the NACHRK (Oct. 28, 1986) report states about a case of
one labor organization:
The organization is said to have been formed at a 
meeting of fifteen persons at the home of an 
expelled Seoul National University student, Kim Son- 
Tae, last June 14, to discuss organizing workers at 
the Kuro Industrial Complex in Seoul. The movement 
rapidly spread, according to the prosecutor, so that 
by the end of August it included 20 "cells" with 101 
organizers, who "planned to organize a Marxist- 
Leninist party with the ultimate purpose of bringing 
about a socialist revolution." As evidence, the 
prosecutor said they had discovered "a thesis on 
Leninist methods of organizing labor."29
Over the years, the Korean student movement has become 
violent and its slogans much more radicalized? its ideology 
nurtures the potential for subversion. Unlike their previous 
movement, it has become distinctive in that some students are 
far more radical than others. This radicalism has raised 
concerns among many people, particularly among the older
28 The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea 
(NACHRK) issued biweekly reports on the situation of human 
rights in Korea.
29 it has been illegal to possess and read Marx or other 
communist literature in South Korea. However, this censorship 
is now more relaxed.
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generation. Their ideological cry reveals that their 
perception of the world is distinctively different from that 
of the preceding generation. This not only segregates the 
older generation but also limits the support from the body of 
students. Such objectionable^^radicalism landed many students 
in jail and many other students were expelled from school. 
In late 1986, according to a government report, of the 3,400 
South Korean political prisoners, 85 percent were students. 
From 1980 to 1987, it is estimated that 124,600 students were 
expelled (however, most of them were returned later) from 
four-year universities due to involvement in the student 
movement (Henderson, 1988:1).
Fearing for his safety one student says, "I didn't go to 
the demos because I have to think of my self-interest." "If 
you're in a demo, it's good for social conditions - but not 
for your future. The government investigates you" (Recitation 
from Gittelsohn, July 1, 1987:28). Another student responded: 
"I was too scared. If you got arrested you might not be able 
to get a job, or you might get sent to the army"30 (Recitation
30 In an attempt to segregate the student activists from 
the ordinary student body, the Chun government introduced a 
program, so-called the "Greening Project" which had forcibly 
conscripted some of identified activists into the army in 
order to depoliticize them. According to the government, 465 
student activists were subjected to this program between May 
1980 and the end of 1983. Among 465 student inductees six 
were found dead. The causes were unknown, but, according to 
the army report, five of them had committed suicide and one 
was killed accidentally. This case was widely used to provoke 
agitation on campus. (Wonmo Dong, 1986:239)
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from Brant, spring 1988:22) Evidently most of students are 
concerned with their self-interest and many of them do not 
even want to take an explicit stand.
Contrary to the majority of students, one student leader 
at Yonse University, who is considered a moderate, told a New 
York Times reporter in an interview that "I am not afraid of 
going to jail. As a student leader, it's something I take for 
granted." The reporter asked again "Will you have difficult 
getting a job?" Said the student, "It would be an honor if 
I didn't get a job because of my activities. I will be doing 
the same thing I am now, fighting for democracy" (Kristof, 
August 2, 1987). Approximately 5-10 percent of the students 
are considered to be activists. However, it may be largely 
the cultural factor that such minority students can influence 
the rest of the majority (4 0-60 percent) of students.
As seen in the above statements, a lot of student 
activists have evidently risked their careers for the 
movement.31 How could some students be bold enough to risk 
their lives? Assuming that human action is rational 
reflecting the econo-cultural environment in balancing costs 
and benefits, minimizing the former and maximizing the latter,
31 The students who are once blacklisted for joining the 
ranks of activism are usually left with little choice other 
than to become revolutionaries. As Shim Jea Hoon (1986:36- 
41) puts it, "Harsh reprisals aimed at critics, such as 
deprivation of jobs or expulsion from universities, have 
pushed some oppositionists to becoming fulltime 
revolutionaries."
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a question must be asked how they can risk their promising 
career right at its threshold? What is in their heads? To 
answer this question, it is necessary to examine the role of 
ideology in depth.
V. ROLE OF IDEA, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTH
In discussing the role of ideology, I am not intending 
to argue that voluntarism (i.e., political consciousness), as 
neo-Marxists (Marcuse, 1972) assert, is a determining factor 
in revolutionary movement. Nor do I intend to attempt to 
resolve the intellectual controversy over this issue as to 
whether ideology causes revolution or simply adds to it. What 
I am trying to do in this chapter is to observe that ideas do 
give focus and direction to the continuing movement, 
is important, as Rhyne (1988:9) points out, "in aiding a 
protest group to spell out its ends, to name its enemies, and 
(most important of all) to define itself to itself." 
Collective behavior theorists (Smelser, 1963) assert that 
there can be street riots and other forms of collective 
behaviors, but, without the idea about who it is, where it is 
going, who stands to thwart its path, the collective behaviors 
end up as random outbursts of unfocused anger. Therefore, 
Rhyne argues that the ideology is a pull factor that 
facilitates the movement into the following three ways:
ildeology
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...(1) It gives focus and direction to any 
frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have, 
thereby bringing some unity of perception. That is, 
it facilitates the process whereby the diverse 
concerns and rages of disparate members can be 
melded into a limited number of shared feelings and 
be made to focus on common ends and common enemies.
... (2) It facilitates the process of clearly 
separating the "us" from the "them.” Armed with 
moral absolutes and stark dichotomies, a member of 
a protest group can give far more unstintingly of 
his or her time, and possibly life, and is able to 
see the opponent as undeserving of forgiveness or 
mercy. Without these processes operating in some 
kind of joint, communal way neither the co-ordinated 
actions nor the lethal challenges so necessary to 
violent conflict would be possible.
...(3) In Sorel's illuminating conception, (1950) 
it is in the realm of ideas that one can identify 
the Mvth without which no great deeds, "heroic 
action" as he put it, are possible. To him, the 
Mvth makes it possible to link individual goals to 
a single task, to translate abstract ideals into a 
concrete path of action, and to energize all with 
the belief that the world will be transformed if all 
will follow the single, common call to action. The 
Myth is thus not primarily a summary of beliefs or 
a diagnosis of what is wrong with the world; it is 
a design meant to convince the believer that great 
things will happen if the common action is pursued.
In his time, it was the call to a General Strike 
that Sorel saw as the Myth which would unite the 
French proletariat in the transformation of their 
world. (Rhyne, 1988:10)
In Q.Y. Kim*s view, the real cause of the student 
uprising in 1960 was not the motivation of conspiratorial 
ideology but primarily by "the disjunction between the content 
of education and the criteria of legitimacy" (1983:209). In 
other words, the students rose against the Syngman Rhee 
government "for its failure to live up to the ideals of
liberal democracy" (Kim, 1983:210). Thus, according to him,
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because of this lagging condition, students were angered. So j
!
the uprising was purely spontaneous, i.e., it was not planned ^
i
ahead. For example, the 1960 student uprising initiated with 
a small group of students, a network of friends, in Taegu who 
mobilized the first student revolt on February 28, 1960. They 
rebelled simply against the unfair order of the Commissioner 
of Education (of Kyungbuk Province) to keep school open on 
Sunday, which was an obvious attempt by a government officer 
to keep the students away from the planned opposition party's 
Sunday campaign rally for the coming presidential election on 
March 15, 1960 (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:36-40).
It is obvious to me that there were no interuniversity 
plans and national coordinations at the threshold. No student 
group premeditated their protests: i.e., there were no clear 
common objectives fueled by subversive ideas. However, that ]
does not mean we must view it as a purely spontaneous event 1
1
as Kim asserts. It is certain that small groups in friendship | 
circles and classmates carefully planned to mobilize their 
student body. Evidently, these small circle of already 
concerned students took pre-existing ideas and made potential 
participants not only aware of them but made those ideas 
meaningful to them. Those ideas, such as academic freedom, 
liberty, and democracy, were extensively utilized in order to 
justify the moral cause of their revolt, to spell out their
i
goal, and, more importantly, to provide the picture of a^ 
wishful state of affairs. As Crane Brinton (1963:49)
suggests, "ideas are always a part of the pre-revolutionary
Our basic liberty is in danger. The freedom to rest 
from the week's labor on Sunday —  the most 
fundamental right of mankind all over the civilized 
world —  is now to be taken away from us. (Q. Y.
Kim, 1983:41)
It is apparent that they capitalized on these pre­
existing ideas to facilitate their protest movement. J Without 
ideas, the revolt follows "in haphazard eruptions of unfocused 
anger" (Rhyne, 1988:9). Ideas provide a blueprint for the 
continuing movement. Undoubtedly, it has been evident that 
the further the Korean student movement goes, the better the 
ideology becomes articulated and subversive.
But the most important fact is that students emotionally 
embrace some mythical qualities in their cultural legends of 
the movement within the country's history. In other words, 
they give a noble interpretation on the historical role of 
students. They feel that they succeed in acting out of a 
nationalistic, patriotic tradition. For example, the first 
student revolt at Taegu in 1960 received extensive media 
attention because two days later was the day commemorating the 
March First Liberation Movement against Japanese colonial 
power which occurred in 1919, at which many students were 
sacrificed. The 1919 Liberation struggle was symbolically 
meaningful in the minds of Koreans, invoking the spirit of 
patriotic movement. Thus, regarding the student revolt against
situation No ideas, no revolution." The students in the
initiation stage formulated their ideas as follows
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the order to keep school open on Sunday, the media portrayed 
this incident as a continuing symbol of the patriotic young 
students' struggle for freedom and justice. In a similar way, 
the students of Korea University in Seoul, after being 
attacked by a gang mobilized by the ruling party during the 
demonstration, received extensive media attention propitious 
to the student side. This media coverage seemed to give 1 
renewed momentum to the Korean student movement in 1960. /
Seen from the process of the April revolution32, there is"!
Is a/
no evidence that any group or organization plotted to topple d f 
the ruling regime and to take over power. In other words, 
there was no ideological conspiracy believable to the 
protesters before action was provided, except a symbolic 
interpretation of the role of students by mass media. The 
students simply utilized the pre-existing ideas, justice, 
freedom, and democracy to express the justification for their 
collective action, and furthermore equipped with "a noble 
interpretation of the historical process1' (Oberschall,
32 The way one defines the revolution varies according to 
what perspective one has. There is a wide range of controversy 
as to whether the event should be called a revolution or not. 
Some call it, the April revolution? others, the April 19th 
Righteous Uprising; or still others, simply the Sa-il-gu 
(April 19th). Q.Y. Kim (1983:8) defines the event simply the 
"revolt" "because it had neither strong leadership nor 
unifying organization or ideology." It is self-evident that 
there was neither a plot by any organization or group to gain 
power nor significant transformation of social structures with 
class upheaval. However, it brought the collapse of the 
ruling regime which seems to form an important part of a 
revolutionary movement.
1973:181). However, as we have seen, the Mythic quality
combining the old historical moral traditions and new Western
ideas were utilized by the students in order to facilitate the
movement. The Korea University students issued a leaflet
before their action:
We all know that the tradition of our school is a 
glorious one. Our school fought against the Japanese 
for our national independence! Such a feat one does 
not forget! We must not permit our noble tradition 
to be blemished. We cannot sit idly by while such 
injustice is perpetrated. (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:39)
Again combining with a set of moral ideas and the noble
interpretation of historical processes, any collectivity can
be mobilized into the mortal conflict, /it is not the matter
of the cogent ideas or existing historical and cultural facts;
it is rather the translation of them into some kind of
believable plan of action.^/As Sorel (1950:46) pointed out,
men move to action by myths rather than facts.
The mind of man is so constituted that it can not 
remain content with the mere observation of facts, 
but always attempts to penetrate into the inner 
reason of things.
These mythic elements pertaining to the abstract ideas help 
men to move to action and, at the same time, the complete 
system of ideas in their heads works to diagnose and evaluate 
the moral evil and name its enemies, to offer "a counter­
vision in waiting which lights the future," (Rhyne, 1983:16) 
and to call to that heroic action which leads from today's 
gloomy world to tomorrow's shining Utopian society. As Sorel 
(1950:41-2) puts it,
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...men who are participating in a great social 
movement always picture their coming action as a 
battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.
Armed with moral ideas, the Korean students are not hesitant
to judge the reality and convince themselves that they are
going to change the world. According to Sorel, this is so
kind of illusion rather than reality; that is, it is a mytn. \ 
But the important point to keep in mind is that myth is 
neither primarily a set of beliefs nor simply an intellectual 
or philosophical diagnosis of ills in the world; it is rather 
an emotional phenomenon that calls the believer to action. 
In other words, "the myths are", according to Sorel, "not 
description of things, but expressions of a determination to 
act" (1950:50). It is the unconscious factors complete with 
rational ideology that "convince the believer that great 
things will happen if the common action is pursued" (Rhyne, 
1988:10).
In this respect, we can discover great amounts of mythic 
elements out of the 1980s1 Korean student movement. Because 
of the myths, it is possible for the student activists to 
dedicate themselves to the political struggle in spite of 
their risking promising careers. Without question, the Sa- 
il-gu (April 19th) revolution also bore a new myth, and added 
to the existing myths.
Offsprings of the April Revolution! Descendants of 
Tonghak Revolution and the March First Movement!
Let us rise up! (from a leaflet issued at Yonse 
University, Nov. 18, 1981)
Applying a set of moral values, they also identify who are
villains and who are heroes. Then, the common enemy becomes
apparent:
Chun Doo Hwan has committed too many outrages! He 
is worse than a doer or pig! ...Chun Doo Hwan has 
shown for all to see that he is a genocidal murderer 
and he will go down in history for his immorality.
(from the "Declaration of Democratic Students,"
1981: source anonymous)
This clear separation of the evil from the good helps the
movement to bring some unity of perception, that is
"solidarity." These fashions have helped to shape the nature
of the following Korean student movement, and have continued
to inspire the participants in it.
In comparison to the 1960s and 70s, one finds a stark
difference in the 1980s1 student movement. The difference is
conspicuous violence. The students in the 1980s are
apparently far more violent than in the 1960s and 70s. Why?
This question needs to be viewed in terms of ideological
differences. Actually, in most cases, political violence is
initiated by military or police action. Generally
demonstrations turned violent at the moment "when the
authorities intervened to stop an illegal but nonviolent
action" (Zimmermann, ‘ 1983:126).
33 An abortive peasant revolution in 1893, during the time 
of Yi dynasty's disintegration.
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However, it seems to me that the students in the 1980s 
use violence as a tactical means to draw the media attention J
I
in an attempt to publicize their movement goals. Furthermore, 
the violence also results from their morally absolute ideas. 
Unlike their forebears in the 1960s and 7 0s, the students in 
the 1980s have become an "ideologically cohesive and 
tactically effective force" (Dong, 1988:B2). They claim in 
their appraisal of the previous movement that "the student 
movement up to the late 1970s was a romantic one, simply 
protested against the dictatorship under the names of freedom 
and democracy" (111 Song Chung, 1985:5) , which means that they 
were naively optimistic about political reform within the 
system. They declare that the year of 1980 was the end of 
romanticism in the student movement. The students view that 
the goal of the April student revolution in 1960 has not been 
achieved yet: it is still in the process. They believe that 
they are successors of the April movement and feel an 
obligation to complete it, which implies that they are 
determined to make real and violent revolution by their own 
will. This means that they now have their own ideology and 
are prepared to struggle for it. Thus, the student movement 
of the 1980s has become self-consciously theoretical in 
ideology better articulated than before and more concrete in 
issues. Despite little changes in the structure of thej 
movement, this ideological maturation in the 1980s tends to! 
reveal a stark difference from the previous student movement.
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Student activists in the 1980s, having reinterpreted 
Korea*s history, believe that the masses have been exploited 
and oppressed under both the Japanese and their authoritarian 
Korean successor, and that "the people must be liberated from 
an exploitative economic system which is dependent on 
comprador-monopolized capital" (Henderson, 1988:17). Students 
also believe that Korean business leaders, whom they see as 
being supported by massive foreign capital, "maintain a low- 
wage policy and an agricultural import policy [low-grain 
price] which benefits only themselves" (Henderson, 1988:17). 
They are convinced that present anomalies of structure in 
Korean society have been affected by this process. The 
students believe that the true barrier to the democratization 
of Korean society is the comprador-bureaucratic capitalism 
which was primarily imposed by foreign powers —  i.e., neo­
colonial powers. By virtue of the foreign imperialistic 
capitalism, Korea has failed to secure her national 
sovereignty and establish a self-reliant economy. The result 
of an economic system dependent upon the neo-colonial 
capitalism is not only anti-democratic but also anti­
reunification of Korea. Under this economic system, according 
to the students:
...the ruling coalition (the military, monopoly
capital and bureaucrats) dependent on foreign powers
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attempts to construct the permanent Miniuna54 
exploitation system and to make the stable self 
reproduction. Therefore, the basic structure of the 
present Korean society can be understood as the 
state monopolistic capitalism dependent on foreign 
powers in economic realm and as the anti-democratic, 
authoritarian, military fascism in political realm; 
to sum up, it can be understood as the twofold
Miniuna is a Korean word, which literally means the 
mass of the people ("min" can be interpreted as "people" and 
"jung" as the "mass"). However, the concept has strong 
historical meaning. The concept was initially used by a 
nationalist Buddhist monk during the Japanese colonial period. 
The concept was originally meant to describe "mass"; "first, 
the people who don't have sovereignty under the colonial 
system and under the situation where feudal monarchy withered 
away. Second, the people, nevertheless, who are dedicated to 
achieve their sovereignty by struggling against the colonial 
system." Presently, this concept is widely used in south 
Korea. Dr. Han Wan Sang in his book, Miniuna Sociology 
(Seoul: ChongRo Books Inc., 1984) argues that the concept of 
miniuna differs from the Marxian concept of the proletariate 
class. According to him, it is a broader category of people 
which is determined not only by the mode of production but 
also by the political processes. Thus, it includes all the 
alienated ruled who are economically exploited, politically 
oppressed, and socially discriminated. It seems to me that 
much of his emphasis is put on the overtly subjective 
criteria, so that it is still very vaguely and imprecisely 
defined. However, the way in which the students have defined 
it may be useful to understand their ideological rhetoric. 
According to them, Miniuna is the class coalition formed by 
labor, peasantry, the urban poor, as well as the urban middle 
and lower class. It only excludes the class of comprador 
monopoly capitalists, comprador bureaucrats, and the comprador 
military group. As they put it:
The concept "Minjung in the Minjung-democracy" 
should be grasped as the main revolutionary agent 
of the world history, as a historical conception and 
as a class coalition. The Korean social structure 
is the product of the dependent industrialization 
process. As a result, the social conflict does not 
take the singular shape of the capitalist-labor 
conflict, but the reiterated complex shape of the 
conflict between monopoly capital and informal 
section, the conflict between monopoly capital and 
agricultural section and the like. In this sense, 
"Miniuna" is the class coalition at the core of 
labor, peasantry, and the urban poor. (What is 3- 
Min Ideology? 1985:8)
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Miniuna exploitation system. (What's the 3-Min 
Ideology? 1985:6)
The following are views of the students on the internal
products of structural process of capitalism in south Korea:
Generally, in the process of the capitalist 
formation (the construction of capitalist state - 
the creation of capitalist mode of production), the 
state distorts the civil society and serves as a 
Total Capitalist. In particular, the authoritarian 
system constructed by process of the dependent 
industrialization, namely the military fascist35 
system dependent on foreign powers complements the 
weakness of the capital, and at the same time 
contrives to exclude the Minjung section (labor, 
peasantry, the urban poor, and the urban middle and 
lower class) politically. (What's the 3-Min 
Ideology? 1985:5)
The students believe that the economic development that 
industrialization has brought is actually a deformed one, and 
it only benefits a handful of elites in Korean society. Thus, 
they must convert their ideological path from "Liberal 
Democracy" to "Minjung Democracy." The "Minjung Democracy" 
implies a state of complete transformation of political and 
social structures with class upheaval from below fminiuno  ^
into a politically and economically equal society. A strong 
abiding hope of students is that if the united miniuna 
overthrow the handful who wield evil power, it will lead to
35 The students define "fascism" as "the system which 
obliterates democracy, oppresses the people with weapons, and 
deprives them of their natural rights (in a political sense), 
and which puts the people under the screw in order to preserve 
the vested interests of a few privileged groups (in a economic 
sense). (from a leaflet of "Declaration on the Current 
National Situation," The Democratic Student of Seoul National 
University, March 1981)
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a future earthly utopia. As they perceive the situation:
It is more than twenty years that a dictatorial 
regime, enemy of democracy, has stood over people 
with the aid of the force of guns and swords, in the 
guise of "Liberal Democracy." Until the middle of 
the 70's the student movement called for the 
recovery of "Liberal Democracy." But the time of 
frustration has been too long. During the long time 
of set-backs and frustration, the color of liberal 
democracy has faded. In the 80s, the students have 
with great effort given fresh colors to the tired 
and faded democracy. And this democracy has been 
called miniuna democracy. (Student* s Reaction to the 
Public Prosecutors* Interim Report of the 
Investigation of "Sammintu" - committee, 1986:4)
Since the Sammintu student movement organization had
professed three basic goals: liberation of the masses
(minjung), attainment of democracy (miniu), and the
reunification of Korea fminiok), the main rhetoric behind most
of the demonstrations represents democratization (Minju__wha)
and reunification (Tongil). it is the students* belief that
to make Korea a democratic society is to move one step further
to reunifying the nation. As these goals are achieved, the
liberation of miniuna will naturally follow. However, they
discover with reinterpreting history that the dictatorial
regime is not the sole enemy; for them the real enemy is
behind the undemocratic regime, that is, imperial capitalist
power. Therefore, they think that in order to achieve
democracy and unification in Korea, they must struggle against
foreign imperialistic powers. Most of their arguments revolve
around their perception of Japan*s and America’s role in
Korean history, particularly toward the United States. As one
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student publication puts it:
We understand clearly that the United States is the 
basic enemy who prevented us from achieving 
democracy, both through the Kwangju incident and in 
the presidential election. Therefore, we see 
clearly that democracy can not flourish in this land 
until we are freed from the United States. Not a 
single soul ventures to assert any more that the 
United States is the guardian of world peace or the 
motherland of democracy. ...The United States is 
precisely the power that acted as the chief 
instigator to divide our fatherland, precisely the 
power that stage-managed dictatorship in this 
country....(Young Pupils Devote Their Hearts to the 
Proud Korean Minjung, 1988)
The students tend to believe that no progressive change is
possible until American troops and political influences are
eliminated. In short, the major blame is fixed upon the
foreign imperialistic powers, more precisely on the United
States, for the structural anomalies in Korean society while
the authoritarian Korean successors are nothing but puppets
manipulated by imperialists.
In their zeal for moral purity, the students tend to make~~j
a stark dichotomy: something is either absolutely right or
absolutely wrong. "If one decides that the government is the
purveyor of falsehood, the opposite must be true" (Buruma,
1987:36). The true conscience of the nation is carried only
by the students, and fundamentally irreconcilable with the
spoiled power.
It is impossible for the majority of the people and 
the Chun Doo Hwan clique to exist together. The 
struggle is reaching the decisive stage, and the 
final fight between a tiny fascistic clique and the 
democratic majority is at hand. The victory of 
people is historically inevitable... ("Emergency
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Student Council," Korea University: Sep. 17, 1980)
In morally absolute terms, the enemy for them becomes 
distinctive: the foreign imperial powers and its puppets who 
act against the will of the miniuna. Having defined their 
enemy, their faith convinces them that if they kick out all 
imperialistic foreign power, the puppets, in their simplistic 
logic, the dictatorial political and comprador-monopolized 
regime, will be so volatile that the miniuna will gain self- 
reliance? democracy will be in bloom? this will lead to the 
peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, then the 
nationalistic Utopian society will come to exist.36
As has been seen, the ideology developed by the radical 
Korean students in the 1980s is starkly different from the 
conventional ideology of South Korea. In addition, their 
paradigmatic perception of the world has also shifted 
considerably from the taken-for-granted world views of the
36 It is apparent that the Korean student leaders are 
adherents of nationalism as well as Marxism. However, it 
should not be understood that radical ideology is the sole 
determining factor of revolution. For example, the uprising 
in 1960 did not have an ideology such as Marxism. In terms 
of nationalism, it seems to me that it helps consolidate 
movement solidarity and enhance the alliance among different 
groups.
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older generation.37 The two paradigms are most likely 
competing with each other for political hegemony. With 
respect to reality, their ideological cry seems impossible to 
achieve by compromise or reconciliation with the present 
government because of the similarity between the ideological 
stance of students and that of North Korea.
However, the fundamental problem does not lie in their
rational ideological belief. More importantly, the students
—  -----------------
translate their ideology into a concrete path of action. They 
have an image of transformed better world and believe that 
solidarity and the pursuit of common action is the means by 
which the transformation of society will be realized. So, 
they are called to action. This is what Sorel calls a myth. 
An aspect of reality is given to the hopes of immediate 
action, believing that through concerted action something real 
can be achieved. This illustrates that "revolts are born as 
much as out of hope as out of anger" (Rhyne, 1988:class) . All 
too often, the Korean student movement is apparently seen with 
much more hope as well as anger or frustration.
With respect to faith and determination, a student who
set fire to the United States Information Service building in
37 The meaning of a generation here does not solely
indicates an age cohort category. It refers to a social group 
of varied pool of people who share the same sense of 
historical experiences. According to Braungart (1984:350), 
generations are not born, but made? thus, "A generation shares 
not only age-group membership ....but a sense of social
consciousness and participation in the historical process."
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Pusan 1982, said in his final statement in the appellate 
court:38
Democratic society will never be realized until you 
and I determine to sacrifice ourselves for it. ...
I hope that my death will be a turning point of 
U.S.-Korea relations, and that the U.S. government 
will not longer force the Third World countries to 
maintain the Cold War system, but will support and 
help her friend to build a democratic society and 
a unified country. The relationship of both 
countries should be based on equal friendship, not 
vertical control. (Source and translation from the 
"Cry of the People Committee," May 11, 1983)
As a radical student organization puts their determination to
struggle:
We are the noble sons and daughters of the 
magnanimous Paedal Race, the Korean Miniunq. ...As 
we assess the present situation, we see that the 
fate of our fatherland has fallen permanently into 
the grasp of American dominion and aggression. We 
can not merely sit idly by and watch. Moreover, we 
can no longer sit idly by while the masses groan 
once again under the oppression of military 
dictatorship. We swear by our burning patriotic 
hearts that will stand in the vanguard of the 
struggle for national salvation, offering up our 
hearts and bodies in all purity. ("Oath of the Young 
Student National Salvation Suicide Squad," Feb. 16,
1988)
The Council of the National Student Federation formed in 1988
expresses their hopes on the reunification of Korea:
It has been 44 years since the division of the Korea 
peninsula by American neo-colonial power. The 
economic and military invasion of American 
imperialism has made this land frozen with mass- 
production of murderous tear gas and also obligation 
for those divided and colonized people to fight 
against colonial powers in recovering national 
sovereignty and in obtaining full freedom. However, 
not having a motherland to defend and to love, what
38 • •He received death sentence, but it was reduced later 
to life imprisonment.
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can we do? Therefore, we, the students who are 
proud of having struggled for a liberated nation 
since the Japanese colonialism, desire to contribute 
to the rescue of our nation and reunification of our 
people with greater sense of patriotic obligation.
("We should Never be Two," April, 1988:2)
From what I have discussed, it becomes apparent that
radical Korean students utilize abstract ideas and do abide
by cultural myths (such as, "history calls us!") by giving
noble interpretations to history for their movement. Those
radical students are convinced that they are the elect,
destined to carry out the will of miniuna. It is from these
myths that one can espouse to the morally absolute terms,
good-or-evil, as being a believable call to action. Black and
White are easily identified: the ruling regimes are villains;
the activists are heroes. By this they are determined to act
and they believe that "their cause is certain to triumph"
(Sorel, 1950:42). As their movement goes further, their ideas \
i
become consolidated, and their faith becomes deeper in 
conviction and greater in hope. By this hope they can bring
,
themselves into mortal conflict. In sum, the essential point 
here is that the presence of such ideas makes it easier to 
create a more or less organized protest group in line with 
their resource base (i.e., organizational structure).
VI. CONCLUSION
I have discussed the historical processes of the Korean 
student movement that have surfaced in the last three decades. 
Instead of identifying the structural and psychological 
variables which may underlie the movement, I have concerned 
myself with the facilitating factors.
Given the resource mobilization model, the analysis of 
this research suggests that the modern education system in 
South Korea has increased the student population and has thus 
formed a superimposed and segmented collectivity that is 
relatively cut off from the larger society. It is within this 
collectivity that viable and dense organizational structures, 
such as the student government associations, departmental 
activities, various "circle" (club) meetings, etc., have made 
it easier for the Korean students to engage in collective 
action and to endure their movement. Observing the micro 
level of the organizational structure, one of Korea's most 
segmented, cohesive, organizations is the informal, factional 
group which runs through much of Korean life. Such small- 
groups on campuses have been an important dynamic factor in 
facilitating the mobilization process and in sustaining that 
mobilization. It is thus my central argument that with the
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primary networks that link students by means of strong J
emotional ties, the small group cells have been the I
ffundamental unit for mobilizing the Korean student movement, j 
Furthermore, I have viewed the mobilization process of 
the students within the dimension of historical construction. [ 
This dimension tends to be symbolically meaningful for the 
actor. For example, a certain event in history becomes | 
legendary and the belief of it is soon built into a belief !
structure to be shared as a part of communal culture. For 1
this reason historical tradition is an important factor in a J  
quick and effective mobilization.
The Confucian ideal of moral purity appears to be one of 
the abiding cultural themes in the student movement. Also, 
the widespread emphasis on equality underlies the movement 
groups. Such cultural belief structures, however, experience 
what Ogburn (1964:87-95) calls a "cultural lag” arising as a ’ 
result of the differential rate of change between two parts 
of culture in the rapidly changing societal conditions. This 
ambiguous coexistence of change and continuity in a culture 
overall may be an incipient condition of social movement. As 
such, the traditional role of students and the consciousness 
of community are necessarily taken into account as important 
facilitators of the movement.
These cultural themes are combined with new ideas, and \ 
become a great facilitator. The resource mobilization model J  
tends to ignore the significance of these cultural and__
ideological aspects. deas^ in themselves do not determine
whether there is a movement. However, the way in which the
/ .actor translates them into a concrete path of action becomes
/'
an important facilitating factor to make the movement sustain 
its violent confrontation. Ideas give direction to the 
movement by bringing unified perceptions? they also make a 
dichotomy of the "us” and the "them”; and they provide hope 
that great things will happen if we do take action. With the 
presence of the cultural ideas, the Korean students have been 
able to create a more or less organized protest movement and 
to sustain violent confrontation.
Given the ideology of radical students, it is important 
to understand how violence is generated. We find that the 
ideology of the students becomes a paradoxical mixture of 
moral absolutism and virulent antagonism. As Brinton 
(1965:176-2 36) saw it, "reign of terror" and "reign of virtue" 
grow out of the revolutionary mind set. Both extreme 
characteristics of virtue and violence are often two sides of 
the same coin. Thus, extreme moral virtue can at the same 
time be extreme violent absolutism.
One might then ask: to what extent is the Korean student 
movement to be seen as unique? Are we able to find the 
patterns described above other places? The answer is Yes. 
There may be unique cultural elements, such as the traditional 
role of students and a shared sense of homogeneity in the 
Korean student movement. However, at least the two
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categories, the degree of organizational structure and the 
degree of intensity of ideology, can be the major patterns in 
other student movements.
For example, comparing the Korean student movement to the 
one in Indonesia reveals a similar political progression and 
structural background? however, the Indonesian students seem 
to lack a strong cultural homogeneity, that is, a shared sense 
of cohesive meaning that gives the collectivity a sufficient 
feeling of solidarity. Although the Indonesian students have 
various kinds of national and local organizations with a 
rapidly growing student population, they have not successfully 
mobilized for effective challenge to the political regime 
because of their diffused loyalty to various racial, 
religious, and political groups (Lyman, 1965-66:282-293). Of 
course, we must take into account the role of government in 
controlling the movement as an important facilitating factor. 
However, it may be attributed to the fact that unlike the 
Korean students, the Indonesian students do not have a strong 
cultural homogeneity. They seem to lack a nationally shared 
strong identity.
On the other hand, the recent development of the Chinese 
student movement deserves attention not because it occurs 
under the strong state machinery of socialism but because of 
its relatively quick communication despite its seemingly less 
cohesive organizational structure. It is important to note 
that the Chinese students have played a significant role in
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other revolutionary events (for instance, the May 4th movement 
in 1919) . They seem not only to have a historically patriotic 
tradition but also to share a more or less cultural 
homogeneity. In the 1986-87 demonstrations, the students 
actually intended to support the Communist Party policy of 
economic reform. The conservative party members, who were 
concerned lest the students ally with laborers and others, 
intervened and dismissed the party chief Hu Yaobang, who 
initially proposed the liberal reform. The recent death of 
Hu Yaobang has clearly demonstrated the potential of students 
for an organized opposition movement capable of presenting a 
lethal challenge to the Party. This incident implies that the 
Chinese student collectivity at any time can move from a 
latent to a rigorous political opposition group (even become 
a revolutionary force) especially when the Party is perceived 
to be weak, confused, and pusillanimous.
Many student movements seem to begin more out of hope ' 
than anger or frustration. The recent Chinese student 
movement is a good example: "Perhaps the march will not bring 
democracy today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but if 
we keep working on it, China has hope," said one participant 
in the march, ..."We have to transform China" (Daily Press, 
Fri. May 5, 1989) . The moderation of the movement can be
developed into a violent protest, especially when the students 
convince themselves that they carry out the will of their 
nation. As they convince themselves that "their cause is
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certain to triumph” (Sorel, 1950:42), the opponents of their 
cause become not just human enemies but moral degenerates? 
they become sinners. Then, the movement is likely to become 
increasingly violent. Although this type of action is not 
rationally calculated, as Weber views it, this emotional 
aspect of action can change the course of history.
In sum, it is because of these two major facilitating 
factors (organizational structure and cultural ideas), among 
others, that the Korean student movement has been easily 
mobilized in political opposition for the last thirty years. 
They are likely to remain as an important political group for 
some time to come. Particularly when the government appears 
to be incompetent and is perceived to be illegitimate, the 
student group is likely to be a potentially subversive force. 
However, if the present democratization continues and the 
society becomes more pluralized, as diverse interest groups 
become organized, the student movement may become increasingly 
divergent in the South Korean political process. 
Nevertheless, as long as students retain a resource bases for 
potential mobilization, no one can say for sure that the 
student movement will disappear.
APPENDIX I
Chronology of Student Movement in South Korea39
Spring, 1450
Students at National Confucian Academy in Seoul 
protest the Great King Sejong’s alleged "soft-on- 
Buddhism" policies. [Altogether 96 protest
incidents by students and scholars occur throughout 
the Yi dynasty (You Young-ik, 1987:65).]
March 1, 1919 - May 192 0
The Korean independence movement begins against 
Japanese colonial rule. Platform of the March First 
Declaration of Independence is spread through 
schools and churches in nationwide demonstrations.
October 30, 1929 - February, 1930
Students in Kwangju who save a Korean girl from a 
group of Japanese students are arrested. This 
incident sparks nationwide student demonstrations 
lasting four months and involving 54,000 students 
and thousands of arrests.
August 15, 1945
Ending of World War II and Liberating from the 36 
year Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. 
Division of Korea was made by the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Beginning of the rightist-leftist 
student and intellectual confrontation.
August 11, 1947
A wave of arrests of leftist political forces begins 
under the United States Military Government in south 
Korea.
39 This section primarily refers to the work of Henderson 
in "Student Activism in Korea" (1988:21-24), and of NACHRK's 
chronological reports of human rights situation in Korea *88 
(1988:23-45) . A large portion are verbatim and come from both 
of the above works.
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April 19, 1960
The student uprising in Seoul protesting the 
fraudulent presidential elections of March 15 is met 
by martial law troops, resulting in 18 6 deaths and 
6,022 injuries. Within a few days demonstrations 
have escalated and led to Syngman Rhee's resignation 
from the presidency on April 29.
May 16, 1961
Military coup of General Park Chung Hee strikes down 
student power, reunification efforts and activism.
Summer, 1961
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency is founded 
as a major national instrument of control and 
suppression of internal criticism.
March, 1964
Students in Seoul demonstrate protesting the Korea1 s 
"low posture" in establishing diplomatic ties with 
the former colonial power.
January - June, 1965
The involvement in the Vietnam conflict and signing 
and ratification of South Korea-Japan normalization 
treaty sparks nationwide student protests; all high 
schools and universities are closed.
January - April, 1974
Four emergency decrees are issued by President Park 
Chung Hee which are extremely suppressive towards 
student organizations and demonstrations. Student 
activists begin to go underground.
September-October, 1977
Student protests increase in intensity, refusing to 
cooperate with the "Student Defence Corps," which 
has become the only legally recognized campus 
organization.
May, 1978
Park re-elected through indirect electoral process. 
This is followed by nationwide student 
demonstrations demanding an end to the Yushin 
Constitution and restoration of civil rights.
October 16-19, 1979
Students in Pusan lead massive demonstrations 
violently denouncing the Yushin system of President 
Park.
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October 26, 1979
Park Chung Hee is shot dead by the KCIA Director, 
Kim Jae Kyu. This brings the so-called "the spring 
of 1980", a hopeful state for democracy.
May 15, 1980
Tens of thousands of students demonstrate in Seoul 
and other cities demanding that the government adopt 
a new democratic constitution and that it lift 
martial law.
May 17, 1980
Martial law is extended throughout the country. 
Student leaders and opposition politicians are 
arrested; the universities are closed and all 
political gatherings are prohibited.
May 18-27, 1980
Kwangju uprising lasts for 10 days (refer to page 
35-36).
March 18, 1982
The American Cultural Center in Pusan is set afire 
by four college students protesting the U.S. policy 
and involvement in Kwangju. One student in the 
building is killed by the fire.
February, 1983
Large-scale arrests of students for alleged 
membership in a "Democratic People's Federation" and 
a tightening of campus security.
September 25, 1984
2,500 Seoul National University students gather to 
revive their autonomous organization and elect a 
president for the Student Association.
May 23, 1985
Seventy-three university students stage a three-day 
sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building in 
Seoul demanding that the U.S. apologize to the 
Korean people for what they call "U.S. involvement 
in the Kwangju incident."
November 18, 1985
191 students from 14 universities in Seoul occupy 
the training center of the ruling Democratic Justice 
Party.
February, 1986
Nineteen students, members of Sammintu committee,
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are indicted in connection with the seizure of the 
USIS building in May 1985, and draw jail terms 
ranging from two to five years.
April 28, 1986
Two students commit suicide by self-immolation 
protesting that military training for students is 
an imposition of U.S. imperialism.
May 3, 1986
Violent student demonstrations occur in Inchon.
May 20, 1986
Seoul National University student burns himself to 
death during a rally on the school campus.
August, 1986
The prosecutor General's Office announces the arrest 
of 169 members of two "leftist-leaning" student 
groups during the spring semester for allegedly 
m a s t e r m i n d i n g  v i o l e n t  a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  
demonstrations.
October 24, 1986
The Seoul District Prosecution announces that its 
crackdown on a 101-member student organization that 
is attempting to establish a Marxist-Leninist party 
identical to that of the North Korean Workers Party 
in an effort to ultimately establish a communist 
country on the Korean peninsula.
October 31, 1986
Large number of Students are stormed by eight 
thousand police on the campus of Konkuk University 
where they are protesting against the legitimacy 
of the Chun regime, and against the U.S. military 
presence in Korea. Students violently resist and 
seize five buildings on campus for three days. This 
results in the arrests of 1,274 students and 395 of 
them are charged under the National Security Law.
December, 1986
Government prosecutors announce that 3,405 persons 
have been arrested in 1986 in connection with 
political activities, including campus 
demonstrations —  the total includes 2,919 students.
January 14, 1987
A Seoul National University student, Park Chong Chul 
died after being tortured during interrogation by 
the National Police. Park's death sparks major 
nationwide student demonstrations and leads to the
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resignation of several important cabinet members in 
the government posts, including arrests of five 
police officers from the Anti-Communist Division of 
the National Police Headquarters who were involved 
in the torture killing.
June 10, 1987
As the ruling party holds its convention to nominate 
Roh Tae Woo as Chun's successor when his term 
expired in early 1988, nationwide student 
demonstrations break out throughout the country.
June 26, 1987
Grand peace march in Seoul and 37 other major cities 
culminates in over two weeks of massive
demonstrations; three days later, Roh Tae Woo
declares direct presidential elections in a 
liberalized atmosphere. There is a partial defusing 
of confrontation with student activists.
July 9, 1987
At a funeral procession for Lee Han Yol, a Yonse 
University student who died after being struck in
the head with a tear gas canister, an estimated
half million march in an anti-government protest.
July 10, 1987
Kim Dae Jung and 2,334 other political offenders 
have their civil rights restored with a sweeping 
amnesty.
May 15, 1988
University student Cho Song Man commits suicide at 
Myongdong Cathedral to protest slow government 
progress on the release of political prisoners. The 
incident ends the de facto truce between the ruling 
and opposition parties and incites the latter to 
call for a government response to the issue. The 
opposition uses the incident to demand a full 
investigation of the Kwangju incident including Chun 
Doo Hwan1s involvement.
May 18, 1988
Eighth anniversary of the Kwangju incident. Violent 
student demonstrations occur in Seoul and other 
cities. Radical students express strong anti- 
American sentiment. A martyr student sets himself 
on fire.
June 10, 1988
Radical students clash with riot police at Yonse and 
other universities across the country. Students
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attempt to march to Panmunjom in the demilitarized 
zone in order to meet their north Korean 
counterparts for a joint conference to discuss 
reunification and North Korea*s demand for co­
hosting the Olympics. Students are turned back by 
60,000 riot police in the Roh government's largest 
display of force against militants.
August 15, 1988
Students' second attempt to march to Panmunjom is 
rebuffed by tens of thousands of riot police; more 
than 2,000 students are arrested. Roh Tae Woo 
proposes a meeting with North Korean leader Kim II 
Sung. Four days later, representatives of the north 
and south Korean government meet for negotiations 
at Panmunjom for the first time in nearly three 
years.
November, 1988
Students clash with riot police throughout the 
country, demanding the arrest of former President 
Chun Doo Hwan. Chun apologizes his wrongdoings 
during his seven-year rule and goes into internal 
exile.
APPENDIX II
METHODOLOGY
This presentation is basically a case study of a student 
movement. The intent was not to make arguments for a 
generalization to all student movements but to build a 
tentative frame of reference.
It was appropriate to employ a qualitative technique for 
this fundamentally interpretative approach. Most of the 
analyses are dependent upon a wide range of secondary, primary 
and near-primary sources as well as statistical data. 
Materials are drawn from a variety of sources: books, essays, 
newspapers, magazines, leaflets, pamphlets, court documents, 
newsletters, publishing letters, and human rights reports. 
I also conducted interviews with two Korean graduate students 
in America who once were involved in the student movement.
The data collection was a somewhat sporadic collection, 
taking bits and pieces from every available source. Given the 
limitations of time and the resources available for me, in 
reality, I encountered many impediments which hindered the 
collection of a very organized, extensive set of data on this
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particular subject. Thus, I have simply tried to obtain all 
the data on the subject that I possibly could. A sizable 
portion of the primary evidence upon which my analysis was 
based came from archival and other historically relevant data 
obtained from organizations in America associated with Korean 
studies, politics, and religion. Those organizations are: The 
Asia Society, a public education organization in New York; The 
Library of Congress (the Korean Section) in Washington, D.C.; 
The Asia Watch, a human rights organization in Washington, 
D.C.; The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea 
(NACHRK),40 a religious affiliated human rights group in 
Washington, D.C.; and The Korea Information & Resource Center, 
a political group in Washington, D.C. Some publications also 
have been received from Korea through mail. Most of the data 
I have collected are written either in English or in Korean.
The following are newspapers and magazines that I have 
drawn from:
Newspapers: (English) The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Chronicle of Higher
Education
(Korean) The Miiu Dong-A (Dailv^
The Miiu Chosun (Dailv^
The Peace Weakly
The New Korea Times (Weakly^
40 I would like to express special thanks to a staff 
member at NACHRK, Ms. Kim Hwa Young, for her help in accessing 
the archival data. A large portion of leaflets and court 
documents would have been unavailable without her generous 
assistance.
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Underground Student Newspapers
The Miniok Miniu Sonun 
The Heabanq Sonun
Magazines (English) Far Eastern Economic Review
Time
Newsweek
(Korean) Shin Dong-A (Monthly^
Chosun (Monthly’)
Current (Monthly)
As the data were initially collected in large, 
unorganized fragments, I attempted to systematize the 
information I had obtained as much as was possible. After 
defining the subject matter as eclectic, I organized the messy 
data according to historical sequences and coded them by their 
categories and properties. The two categories, organizations 
and ideology, were my major focus for the information search. 
For the 1960's and 70's I analyzed the student movement 
primarily from the historical descriptions using the published 
literature. For the 1980's I made extensive use of both 
published literature and various other primary and secondary 
resources.
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